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POLICE MISCONDUCT AS A CAUSE OF 
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
RUSSELL COVEY

 
ABSTRACT 
This study gathers data from two mass exonerations resulting from 
major police scandals, one involving the Rampart division of the L.A.P.D., 
and the other occurring in Tulia, Texas. To date, these cases have received 
little systematic attention by wrongful convictions scholars. Study of these 
cases, however, reveals important differences among subgroups of 
wrongful convictions. Whereas eyewitness misidentification, faulty 
forensic evidence, jailhouse informants, and false confessions have been 
identified as the main contributing factors leading to many wrongful 
convictions, the Rampart and Tulia exonerees were wrongfully convicted 
almost exclusively as a result of police perjury. In addition, unlike other 
exonerated persons, actually innocent individuals charged as a result of 
police wrongdoing in Rampart or Tulia only rarely contested their guilt at 
trial. As is the case in the justice system generally, the great majority 
pleaded guilty. Accordingly, these cases stand in sharp contrast to the 
conventional wrongful conviction story. Study of these groups of wrongful 
convictions sheds new light on the mechanisms that lead to the conviction 
of actually innocent individuals. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Police misconduct causes wrongful convictions. Although that fact has 
long been known, little else occupies this corner of the wrongful 
convictions universe. When is police misconduct most likely to result in 
wrongful convictions? How do victims of police misconduct respond to 
false allegations of wrongdoing or to police lies about the circumstances 
surrounding an arrest or seizure? How often do victims of police 
misconduct contest false charges at trial? How often do they resolve 
charges through plea bargaining? While definitive answers to these 
questions must await further research, this study seeks to begin the 
 
 
  Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. Special thanks are owed to Eric 
Coffelt, who worked hard and traveled far to help me collect data for this study. I also wish to thank 
Brandon Garrett and Sam Gross for their excellent comments on earlier drafts, and to Max Compton 
for his research assistance. 
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inquiry. Specifically, this study attempts to improve our understanding of 
the intersection of police misconduct and criminal justice, and, more 
generally, to contribute to the ever-growing bank of knowledge about 
wrongful convictions. 
What we do know about wrongful convictions comes largely from 
studies of cases terminating in exonerations. These exoneration studies 
have produced a rich dataset from which several factors that contribute to 
wrongful convictions have been identified. While critically important, this 
dataset has significant limitations, chief of which is selection bias. The 
vast majority of the exonerations studied to date occurred in rape cases 
following DNA testing and murder cases often involving the death 
penalty. Such cases, comprising a tiny sliver of the criminal justice system 
workload, are relatively unrepresentative of the vast majority of felony 
convictions. As a result, and as researchers compiling these datasets 
acknowledge, the most closely analyzed data on wrongful convictions 
does not capture a representative sample of the probable distribution of 
wrongful convictions that occur.
1
 
Drawing on new empirical data, this article adds to the wrongful 
convictions dataset by assessing another group of exonerees—those 
exonerated following revelations of systemic police and/or prosecutorial 
misconduct. Specifically, this Article examines two high-profile scandals 
that saw the wrongful conviction and later formal exoneration of large 
numbers of persons. To date, little attention has been paid to such 
exonerees. This, I argue, has affected perceptions of the scope and nature 
of the wrongful conviction problem. The profile of persons exonerated 
following revelations of major police misconduct varies dramatically from 
that of the typical capital murder or DNA exoneree. The defendants in the 
mass exoneration cases were convicted of different types of crimes, faced 
less severe punishments, and were far more likely to plead guilty than 
other exonerated defendants. Using extant data, earlier exoneration studies 
have found that the primary cause of the wrongful convictions in those 
studies is witness misidentification.
2
 Based on those findings, some 
 
 
 1. See Samuel R. Gross & Barbara O’Brien, Frequency and Predictors of False Conviction: 
Why We Know So Little, and New Data on Capital Cases 11–12 (Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law Res. Paper 
No. 93, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=996629. 
 2. See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual 
Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 773 n.19 (2007) (finding, based on 
analysis of sixty-two DNA exonerations as of 2000, that mistaken eyewitness identification is the most 
common factor); Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 through 2003, 95 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 542 (2005) (reporting based on study data that the “most common 
cause of wrongful convictions is eyewitness misidentification”). Edwin Borchard reached the same 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss4/2
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commentators and reform-minded organizations have drawn the 
conclusion that witness misidentification is, in general, the leading cause 
of wrongful convictions.
3
 While the former claim was correct at the time 
those observations were made, the latter generalization likely was not 
warranted. The data we currently have is simply too limited to permit any 
accurate generalizations about how frequently wrongful convictions occur, 
or which contributing factors generate them, in specific or even rough 
proportion.
4
 
Moreover, as one of the nation’s leading experts on exonerations, 
Professor Samuel Gross, has frequently emphasized, the primary causes of 
wrongful convictions are almost certainly crime-specific.
5
 That is, the 
factors that tend to cause wrongful convictions in rape cases are different 
from those that cause wrongful convictions in murder cases, and different 
from the causes of wrongful convictions in burglary cases, assault cases, 
and drug cases. The next generation of research must approach wrongful 
convictions in a more fine-grained manner. 
To that end, this study gathers data from two mass exonerations 
resulting from major police scandals. These exonerations are starkly 
different than most of the exonerations previously studied. In the “mine-
run” cases (if there is such a thing) resulting in individual exonerations, 
often as a result of DNA testing, several contributing factors, ranging from 
eyewitness misidentification to false confessions to faulty forensic 
evidence and testimony, have been identified. In contrast, wrongful 
convictions in the mass exoneration cases are tied together by a single 
dominant causal factor: police misconduct. Prior exoneration studies have 
not focused on this group of exonerees, nor, by and large, have they 
 
 
conclusion in his 1932 study of wrongful convictions. See EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE 
INNOCENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE xiii (1932).  
 3. Drawing on its database of persons exonerated through DNA testing, the Innocence Project 
also claims that mistaken witness identifications are the leading cause of wrongful convictions. See 
Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
Content/351.php. See also Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel 
Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 292 (2006) (describing “mistaken eyewitness 
identifications” as “the most frequent single cause of wrongful convictions”). 
 4. In any event, new data on wrongful convictions suggests that witness misidentification no 
longer can claim the top spot as a contributing cause of known exonerations. See Samuel R. Gross & 
Michael Shaffer, Exonerations in the United States, 1989–2012 40 (Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law and 
Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 277, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2092195 (identifying “perjury or false accusation” as the leading known cause of wrongful 
convictions during time period studied). 
 5. See id. at 102. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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incorporated data from these cases into the datasets.
6
 This Article does just 
that. The experiences of those wrongfully convicted as a result of police 
misconduct differ from other exonerees in interesting and potentially 
important ways. The exonerations resulting from the Rampart and Tulia 
police scandals raise the profile of police misconduct as a known cause of 
wrongful convictions. In addition, the tendency of exonerees in these cases 
to plead guilty rather than go to trial confirms what many have long 
suspected: that the problem of wrongful convictions is not limited to the 
small number of cases in which innocent defendants unsuccessfully 
contest their guilt in a jury trial.  
The article proceeds as follows: Part II describes the Rampart and Tulia 
cases in detail, and sets forth the circumstances leading to mass 
exonerations in those cases. Part III provides a brief description of data 
about wrongful convictions that has been generated in the literature to 
date. Part IV begins by describing the data used in this study. It then 
examines the Rampart and Tulia exonerations in more detail, identifying a 
subset of “actually innocent” exonerees in these cases that can be 
compared with exonerees in other studies. Part IV then undertakes a closer 
analysis of the circumstances and mechanisms that led to convictions of 
innocent Rampart and Tulia defendants. One of the most interesting 
contrasts between the mass exoneration cases studied here and other 
instances of wrongful conviction is that, as compared to other groups of 
exonerees, the great majority here pleaded guilty. Part V takes a closer 
look at this critically important phenomenon and offers some hypotheses 
as to why innocent defendants plead guilty in these cases at such a high 
rate. Disturbingly, the evidence suggests that the factors at work here—
coercive penalties for contesting guilt at trial, coupled with few effective 
defense strategies and unsympathetic forums—may describe the prevailing 
conditions for a large number of, perhaps even most, criminal defendants. 
Part VI considers various types of police misconduct, documenting the 
prevalence of both “procedural perjury” and “substantive perjury,” and the 
fine line between them. Part VI then compares the experiences of actually 
innocent exonerees with those who the evidence suggests, though 
wrongfully convicted, were probably not actually innocent. Based on this 
comparative data, it finds evidence that innocence does dissuade some 
defendants from pleading guilty, but that any “innocence effect” has only a 
minor impact on guilty plea rates. Part VII briefly concludes. 
 
 
 6. One major exception is a new project attempting to compile a comprehensive catalogue of 
known exonerations, including mass exonerations, in a “National Registry of Exonerations.” See id. at 
2. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss4/2
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II. THE RAMPART AND TULIA EXONERATIONS 
On December 16, 1997, the L.A.P.D. arrested police officer David 
Mack on charges of stealing $722,000 from a Los Angeles area Bank of 
America. Three months later, the department fired two other officers, 
Brian Hewitt and Daniel Lujan, for severely beating a handcuffed prisoner 
in an interrogation room.
7
 The common thread was that all three officers 
were either former or current members of the Rampart CRASH, or 
Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums, unit.
8
 Rampart is an area 
covering 7.9 square miles to the northwest of downtown Los Angeles.
9
 It 
is the most densely populated portion of Los Angeles, with 36,000 people 
per square mile, and is widely known as a locus of gang activity.
10
 At the 
same time, the Rampart CRASH unit had a reputation for operating in a 
largely autonomous fashion with little to no oversight.
11
 The arrest of 
Officer Mack and termination of Officers Hewitt and Lujan motivated 
L.A.P.D. Chief of Police Bernard C. Banks to form a special task force to 
investigate the Rampart CRASH unit.
12
  
Then, on March 2, 1998, six-and-a-half pounds of cocaine disappeared 
from an evidence room in Los Angeles.
13
 Within a week, the special task 
force investigators honed in on Los Angeles police officer Raphael Perez, 
a member of Rampart CRASH, as the primary suspect. A year later, trial 
on the charge ended with a hung jury.
14
 Shortly thereafter, Perez cut a deal 
with prosecutors, agreeing to cooperate with a government investigation of 
police wrongdoing in the Rampart CRASH unit.
15
 Perez worked with 
investigators over the next year, divulging over 4,000 pages of 
interrogation transcripts.
16
 Perez’s testimony revealed police corruption on 
 
 
 7. BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO THE RAMPART AREA CORRUPTION INCIDENT, LOS ANGELES 
POLICE DEPARTMENT PUBLIC REPORT 2 (2000). 
 8. Id. at 1. 
 9. Id. at 55. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 69 (“Separate roll calls from the patrol division, a unique patch, jackets, an emphasis on 
narcotics enforcement, and an outward appearance of elitism were common CRASH traits that 
Rampart shared with other CRASH . . . units.”); see also id. at 77–78 (discussing the lack of oversight 
of the Rampart CRASH unit due to the physical separation of the unit from the rest of the Rampart 
division and other affirmative acts taken by the unit to isolate itself). 
 12. Id. at 1. 
 13. Peter J. Boyer, Bad Cops, THE NEW YORKER, May 21, 2001, at 67. 
 14. Id. at 69. 
 15. CRASH is the acronym given to L.A.P.D.’s specialized anti-gang units. Terry McDermott, 
Rafael Perez: The Road to Rampart, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2000, available at http://articles.latimes 
.com/2000/dec/31/news/mn-6831. 
 16. RAMPART RECONSIDERED: THE SEARCH FOR REAL REFORM SEVEN YEARS LATER 53 (2006). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1138 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:1133 
 
 
 
 
an unimagined scale, implicating police officers in wrongful killings, 
indiscriminate beatings and violence, theft, and drug dealing. Perez’s 
testimony also implicated dozens of police officers in systematic acts of 
dishonest law enforcement, exposing hundreds of instances in which 
evidence or contraband was planted on suspects, false statements were 
coerced or fabricated, and police officers offered perjured testimony in 
court. Perez’s confessions prompted the L.A.P.D. to re-name its 
investigative task force the “Rampart Task Force.”17 The Task Force was 
charged with corroborating Perez’s allegations of corruption within 
Rampart CRASH.
18
 What followed was, in the words of one independent 
commission, one of the “worst police scandals in American history.”19 
Ultimately, the District Attorney was able to corroborate hundreds of 
Perez’s allegations and the L.A.P.D. entered into a consent decree with the 
U.S. Department of Justice, submitting to federal oversight of 
departmental operations.
20
 As a result of the scandal, more than three 
hundred prisoners filed writs of habeas corpus seeking to overturn 
allegedly tainted convictions, and approximately 156 felony convictions 
were dismissed or overturned as a result of “Rampart related” writs,21 110 
of which were either initiated or unopposed by the District Attorney.
22
  
The extent of wrongdoing by the L.A.P.D., however, remains a 
mystery to this day largely due to the overall ineffectiveness of the 
L.A.P.D.’s internal investigation of the police force.23 Although Officer 
Perez claimed that “ninety percent of the officers that work CRASH, and 
not just Rampart CRASH, falsify a lot of information” and “put cases on 
people,”24 no investigation or follow-up was ever undertaken to explore, or 
 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. REPORT OF THE RAMPART INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL 1 (2000), available at http://www. 
ci.la.ca.us/oig/rirprpt.pdf. 
 20. RAMPART RECONSIDERED: THE SEARCH FOR REAL REFORM SEVEN YEARS LATER, supra 
note 16, at 6–7, 37–38. 
 21. RAMPART RECONSIDERED: THE SEARCH FOR REAL REFORM SEVEN YEARS LATER App. C. 
Fourteen Rampart related writs remained pending at the time these statistics were compiled. Id. 
 22. Id. To the best of my knowledge, all of the writs initiated or unopposed by the D.A.’s office 
were granted. Courts were far more skeptical in writ cases initiated by defendants if the D.A. opposed 
the writ. Although relief was granted in approximately forty such cases, the large majority of contested 
writ applications were denied.  
 23. RAMPART RECONSIDERED: THE SEARCH FOR REAL REFORM SEVEN YEARS LATER, supra 
note 16, at 47 (concluding that basic facts regarding Rampart corruption scandal remain unknown 
seven years afterwards, including “[t]he extent of Rampart CRASH-like misconduct in the CRASH 
units of other divisions, other specialized units and LAPD policing generally”); see also id. at 54 (“The 
[L.A.P.D.] appeared to lack a clear and well-defined investigative approach and strategy and did not 
establish a plan for interagency coordination.”). 
 24. Id. at 53. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss4/2
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even clarify, those allegations.
25
 In speaking with an investigative panel, 
some officers, who spoke anonymously out of fear of retribution, 
expressed concerns that the department did not genuinely seek to uncover 
the extent of the corruption.
26
 In fact, the L.A.P.D. failed to produce a 
promised “after-action” report which, according to the department, was 
going to include “the exact nature and disposition of each allegation.”27 
Consequently, whatever the department may have uncovered about 
widespread corruption throughout the force remains outside the public 
domain.
28
 
In the spring of 2003, while the Rampart story was winding down, 
news of another major police scandal broke, this time not out of a major 
metropolitan police force but instead in the tiny west Texas town of Tulia, 
located in Swisher County. The Tulia operation began as a roundup of 
suspected drug dealers in the summer of 1999, but transformed into what 
some described as a wholesale assault on the black residents of Tulia. The 
operation was spearheaded by a freelance agent named Tom Coleman.
29
 
Working undercover, Coleman claimed to have bought powder cocaine 
from more than 20% of the adult black residents of Tulia.
30
 In all, nearly 
fifty persons were convicted of selling drugs to Coleman, in most cases 
based solely on Coleman’s uncorroborated testimony.31 
The first several Tulia defendants fought the drug charges at trial and 
were convicted and sentenced to draconian prison terms.
32
 After seeing the 
 
 
 25. Id. at 48, 54. 
 26. Id. at 65 n.95. 
 27. Id. at 62 (internal quotations omitted). 
 28. Id. at 63. 
 29. New York Times reporter Bob Herbert had covered the story even before Coleman’s 
credibility was shattered and the cases fell apart. See Bob Herbert, Tulia’s Shattered Lives, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 5, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/05/opinion/tulia-s-shattered-lives.html?scp=7&sq= 
tulia&st=cse. 
 30. NATE BLAKESLEE, TULIA: RACE, COCAINE, AND CORRUPTION IN A SMALL TEXAS TOWN 5 
(2005).  
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. at 6. Joe Moore was charged with making two drug deliveries: a single gram of crack 
cocaine and an eight ball of powder cocaine. With two prior drug felonies on his record, Moore faced a 
potential sentence, if convicted, of twenty-five to ninety-nine years in jail. Id. at 44. At trial, Coleman 
testified that he purchased the drugs at Moore’s house. Moore acknowledged that Coleman and 
another individual had come by his house, but contended that he chased Coleman away and that 
Coleman was lying about purchasing the drugs. Id. Apart from a small bag of cocaine that Coleman 
claimed to be the fruits of the sale, no evidence corroborated either of the alleged transactions. Id. In a 
contest of credibility pitting law-enforcement officer against convicted drug dealer, the jury banked on 
the officer. Moore was convicted and sentenced to ninety years. Id. at 59. 
 The next two defendants, Chris Jackson and Jason Williams, were convicted based on virtually 
identical evidence. Id. at 82–83. Jackson received a twenty year sentence for allegedly selling an eight 
ball of cocaine. Id. at 83. Williams was convicted of multiple transactions and, based on the additional 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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writing on the wall, however, most of the remaining defendants agreed to 
plead guilty. In all, forty-seven persons were charged and thirty-five were 
convicted. Of the twelve who were not convicted, several were placed on 
deferred adjudication.
33
 
As these cases were tried, however, it became increasingly evident that 
Coleman’s testimony was not credible. Defense attorneys discovered that 
Coleman had been arrested on theft charges in a neighboring county and 
lied about it on his employment application to the task force.
34
 They also 
learned that Coleman had a history of employment problems, mental 
health problems, and significant unpaid debts.
35
 Worse still, it became 
increasingly evident that Coleman’s bosses in Tulia, as well as the 
prosecutor in the Tulia cases, knew of Coleman’s problems and lied about 
them under oath in the course of the Tulia trials.
36
  
After the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals remanded four of the Tulia 
convictions for evidentiary hearings on claims that the prosecutor had 
failed to turn over material exculpatory evidence as required by Brady v. 
Maryland,
37
 hearings were conducted before a different trial judge. In the 
course of the hearings, it became clear that Coleman had perjured himself 
on numerous occasions during the Tulia trials, and that other law 
enforcement officials may have done so as well.
38
 Ultimately, the state 
agreed to a global settlement with defense attorneys in which it stipulated 
that Coleman was not a credible witness, vacated every conviction 
obtained as a result of the sting operation without seeking new trials 
against any of the defendants, and provided $250,000 to be divided among 
the defendants.
39
 In exchange, the defendants agreed not to sue the 
county.
40
 The state judge who presided at the hearing found “that Mr. 
 
 
allegation that the sales occurred in a drug-free zone, received a forty-five year sentence, 
notwithstanding that he was only nineteen years old and had no prior convictions. Id. 
 Cash Love, one of the few white suspects arrested in the sting operation, was convicted of making 
eight sales, some in a drug-free zone, and was sentenced to 361 years. Id. at 92. Another defendant, 
Donnie Smith, was convicted of the first of several drug charges and sentenced to two years. Id. at 
136. He pleaded guilty to the remaining charges and received a twelve and a half year sentence. Id. at 
136–37. After Smith, two more defendants gambled on jury trials and lost. Freddie Brookins, Jr. was 
sentenced to twenty years. Id. at 157. Kareem Abdul Jabbar White received a sixty year sentence. Id. 
at 177. 
 33. Id. at 409. 
 34. Id. at 103–04. 
 35. Id. at 302–05. 
 36. Id. at 305–07, 388–89. 
 37. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See BLAKESLEE, supra note 30, at 317. 
 38. BLAKESLEE, supra note 30, at 388–89. 
 39. Id. at 384, 386. 
 40. Id. at 385. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss4/2
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Coleman had engaged in ‘blatant perjury’ and was ‘the most devious, 
nonresponsive law enforcement witness this court has witnessed in 
twenty-five years on the bench in Texas.’”41 Coleman was eventually tried 
and convicted of one count of perjury and sentenced to ten years 
probation.
42
 
Although the settlement was contingent on approval by the Court of 
Criminal Appeals, when that approval was not immediately forthcoming, 
the Texas legislature passed a bill “specifically authorizing” the judge “to 
grant bond to the defendants.”43 Texas Governor Rick Perry then asked the 
Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles to review the cases. Pardons were 
granted to all thirty-five Tulia defendants convicted as a result of the sting 
operation.
44
 Two more individuals later were exonerated by courts.
45
 
Rampart and Tulia together account for nearly two hundred cases of 
wrongful conviction and represent two large sets of exonerations 
stemming from police corruption scandals. But these are not the only 
major scandals that have recently beset law enforcement organizations in 
the United States, or even in Texas. In Hearne, Texas, numerous cases in 
2001 were dismissed following revelations that a drug task force was 
systematically targeting black residents in an effort, allegedly, to drive 
them from the community.
46
 As in Tulia, the evidence against the 
defendants in these cases consisted solely of the uncorroborated assertions 
of a single, unreliable, police informant. Although most cases were 
dismissed prior to conviction, some innocent defendants pleaded guilty 
before the police wrongdoing was exposed.
47
 A year later, in the so-called 
“Dallas Sheetrock scandal,” at least thirty-nine criminal cases were 
dropped or dismissed after it was discovered that white powder allegedly 
recovered from criminal suspects and identified through field-tests as 
cocaine was actually ground up sheetrock packaged to look like cocaine. 
 
 
 41. Steve Barnes, Rogue Narcotics Agent in Texas Is Found Guilty of Perjury, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
15, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/15/national/15tulia.html (last visited, Sept. 30, 2011). 
 42. BLAKESLEE, supra note 30, at 408. 
 43. Id. at 389. 
 44. A lawsuit brought against Coleman and the “26-county Panhandle Regional Narcotics 
Trafficking Task Force” by forty-five individuals caught up in the sting operation was settled in 2004 
after the defendants in the lawsuit agreed to payment of six million dollars. See Barnes, supra note 41. 
 45.  Janelle Stecklein, Judge reverses probation decision of Tulia brothers, AMARILLO GLOBE-
NEWS (Feb. 5, 2011, 1:12 AM), http://amarillo.com/news/local-news/2011-02-05/decision-reversed-
tulians. 
 46. A.P., Texas: Suit Filed Over Drug Arrests, 11/2/02 N.Y. TIMES (Abstracts), 2002 WLNR 
10823176.  
 47. See First Am. Compl. For Inj. Relief And Damages And Jury Trial at 5, Kelly v. Paschall, 
No. 02-A-02-CA-702 JN (W.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2003). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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All of the victims in the scandal were blue-collar Mexican immigrants 
who spoke little or no English.
48
 
Another Tulia-like scandal erupted more recently in St. Charles Parish, 
Louisiana, where seventy narcotics cases made by a single undercover 
officer were dismissed following revelations that the undercover officer 
had lied under oath in a criminal investigation. Before the scandal broke, 
at least twenty persons in cases made by the undercover officer had 
already pled guilty.
49
 An even larger Rampart-style corruption case has 
unfolded in Camden, New Jersey.
50
 Other incidents have also grabbed 
recent headlines.
51
 Gross and Shaffer have identified twelve separate 
incidents involving group exonerations based on police misconduct 
involving exonerations of at least 1,100 people.
52
  
 
 
 48. See Paul Duggan, ‘Sheetrock Scandal’ Hits Dallas Police: Cases Dropped, Officers Probed 
After Cocaine ‘Evidence’ Turns Out to Be Fake, WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2002), http://www.washington 
post.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A229-2002Jan18?language=printer. 
 49. See Cop’s Alleged Past Ruins 70 St. Charles Parish Drug Cases, FOX EIGHT LIVE (Sept. 20, 
2010, 2:40 PM), http://www.projectnola.com/the-news/news/42-fox-8/106713; Lori Lyons, St. Charles 
drug arrests in jeopardy after undercover cop discredited, authorities say, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Sept. 
20, 2010, 8:15 PM), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2010/09/st_charles_drug_arrests_in_jeo. 
html. To the best of my knowledge, however, and unlike Tulia, none of those guilty pleas have been 
overturned. 
 50. The full scope of the Camden scandal is still not clear. More than two hundred people have 
had convictions vacated or charges dismissed as a result of confessed misconduct implicating at least 
five officers in wrongdoing. The misconduct includes planting evidence on innocent persons and 
providing false testimony to convict them of crimes they did not commit. See Barbara Boyer, Two 
Former Camden Officers Face More Federal Charges, THE INQUIRER (Sept. 10, 2011), http://articles. 
philly.com/2011-09-09/news/30135226_1_original-indictment-amount-of-illegal-drugs-special-operati 
ons-unit. 
 51. In Tulsa, at least five Tulsa police officers have been charged with perjury and witness 
tampering. One defendant faced fifty-eight counts of wrongdoing. At least eleven people were released 
from prison as a result, with more cases under review. See Emory Bryan, Five Tulsa Police Officers 
Indicted in Corruption Probe, THE NEWS ON 6 (July 20, 2010, 9:17 PM), http://www.newson6.com/ 
story/12840428/five-tulsa-police-officers-indicted-in-corruption-probe?redirected=true. In Denver, one 
out of every seventeen police officers has been subject to administrative discipline for “‘departing 
from the truth’” or similar conduct in matters related to their official duties. That figure counts only 
those who have been formally sanctioned. It excludes those who are currently under investigation for 
similar violations, those who were investigated but insufficient proof of wrongdoing was presented to 
sustain a charge, and those whose misdeeds have not yet been detected. Christopher N. Osher, Denver 
cops’ credibility problems not always clear to defenders, juries, DENVER POST (July 10, 2011), 
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_18448755 (reporting that eighty-one officers still on the force out 
of 1,434 are on a list citing violators “in at least one of the following categories: departing from the 
truth, violating the law, making false reports, making misleading or inaccurate statements, committing 
a deceptive act, engaging in conduct prohibited by law, engaging in aggravated conduct prohibited by 
law, conspiring to commit conduct prohibited by law, soliciting or accepting a bribe, removing reports 
or records, destroying reports or records or altering information on official documents”). This list only 
includes the names of officers against whom violations have been formally substantiated. It does not 
include officers who are under investigation, or who were investigated but not cited. Id. 
 52. Gross & Shaffer, supra note 6, at 84. 
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In short, Rampart and Tulia produced numerous exonerations and 
received a significant amount of national attention, but they are not 
unique. Revelations of large-scale police misconduct both preceded and 
post-dated them, suggesting that police misconduct leading to the 
wrongful conviction of innocent persons is a disturbingly common feature 
of the criminal justice system. 
III. WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT EXONEREES GENERALLY 
When it comes to wrongful convictions, very little hard data exists.
53
 
After all, it is extraordinarily difficult to systematically identify erroneous 
convictions of innocent persons. Because the criminal justice process itself 
is assumed to provide the definitive test of guilt or innocence, there are 
few external Archimedean points from which its results may be tested. 
Our knowledge about innocent persons who are wrongfully convicted, 
therefore, is derived primarily from exonerations—that is, cases in which 
some government official, acting in an official capacity, has made a formal 
finding or declaration that a defendant is “not guilty of a crime for which 
he or she had previously been convicted.”54 
Wrongful convictions have been the subject of academic inquiry since 
Edwin Borchard published his pathbreaking studies on the matter in the 
early part of the twentieth century.
55
 Other studies, including an influential 
article by Hugo Bedau and Michael Radelet, followed.
56
 Until quite 
recently, however, the leading study of criminal exonerations has been 
Gross, Jacoby, Matheson, Montgomery, and Patil’s analysis of 
exonerations occurring between 1989 and 2003 (“Gross Study”).57 That 
study has now been updated and greatly expanded in an examination of 
exonerations through 2012.
58
 Brandon Garrett has also made major 
contributions to the bank of knowledge of the exonerated through a series 
of articles, and a book (collectively, the “Garrett Study”) on DNA 
 
 
 53. See Robert Carl Schehr, The Criminal Cases Review Commission As A State Strategic 
Selection Mechanism, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1289, 1290–91 (2005) (describing the number of 
wrongfully convicted persons as a “dark number, a statistical unknown”). 
 54. Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 523, 524 (2005). 
 55. See Edwin M. Borchard, European Systems of State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal Justice, 
3 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 684 (1913); EDWIN BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE 
INNOCENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Yale Univ. Press 1932). 
 56. See Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital 
Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987). 
 57. Gross et al., supra note 54. 
 58. See Gross & Shaffer, supra note 6. 
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exoneration cases.
59
 As the authors of both the Gross and Garrett Studies 
concede, the fact that an individual has been exonerated does not 
conclusively prove that the individual is actually innocent, although often 
the nature and circumstances of the evidence will leave little doubt. 
Nonetheless, formal exoneration is the best that our legal system is usually 
capable of doing, and thus provides the best indicator we have of instances 
in which an actually innocent person has been wrongfully convicted. 
These studies have identified some commonalities in cases resulting in 
exoneration. First, most exonerees were convicted of very serious crimes, 
typically resulting in sentences of death or long terms of imprisonment.
60
 
Second, the vast majority of exonerees contested their guilt at trial. Only a 
tiny handful of exonerees, about 6%, pled guilty.
61
 This fact is particularly 
striking because the vast majority of criminal convictions, upwards of 
90%, are obtained through guilty pleas. Third, although many types of 
procedural and evidentiary errors have been identified in cases of wrongful 
conviction, earlier studies consistently pointed to eyewitness 
misidentification as the leading cause of wrongful convictions, followed 
closely by faulty forensic evidence.
62
 Fourth, the studies suggest that 
persons of color are at far greater risk of false conviction than whites.
63
 
The authors of these studies are quick to deny that the data is in any way 
representative of the wrongfully convicted more generally. As Gross and 
Shaffer observe in a more recent study, “[e]xonerations are unlikely, 
uncommon and unrepresentative of the mass of invisible false 
 
 
 59. Garrett’s main findings regarding the profile of innocent persons who were wrongfully 
convicted can be found in Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (2008). 
Those findings were updated through 2010 in his book. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE 
INNOCENT (Harvard Univ. Press 2011). 
 60. Gross et al., supra note 54, at 535 (“With a handful of exceptions, everyone on our list of 
exonerees was sentenced to death or to a long term of imprisonment. Ninety-three percent were 
sentenced to ten years in prison or more; 77% were sentenced to at least twenty-five years. . . .”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 61. Id. at 536 (finding that 5.8% of exonerees (20/340) pleaded guilty); GARRETT, supra note 59, 
at 150 (reporting that 6%, or sixteen of 250 DNA exonerees, pleaded guilty). 
 62. Gross, supra note 2, at 542; GARRETT, supra note 59, at 48, 89 (reporting that eyewitness 
misidentifications factored in 76% of DNA exoneration cases, and faulty forensic testimony or 
evidence in 74%). Gross’s more recent study, which includes data from a broader source of 
exonerations, including the mass exonerations, finds that perjury or false accusation is the leading 
contributing factor to wrongful convictions overall, but that the prevalence of various contributing 
factors turns heavily on crime of conviction. See Gross & Shaffer, supra note 6, at 40. 
 63. Of the first 250 persons exonerated by DNA evidence, 62% were black, 30% were white, and 
8% were Hispanic. Asians constituted less than 1% of the total. See GARRETT, supra note 59, at 5. 
Moreover, as Brandon Garrett has observed, although minorities are overrepresented in the prison 
population, their numbers among exonerees, or at least DNA exonerees, are even greater. Garrett, 
supra note 59, at 66. 
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convictions.”64 Nonetheless, because their data is the best and most 
reliable that we have concerning wrongful convictions, there is an 
inevitable tendency to generalize or draw inferences about the 
characteristics, frequency, and causes of wrongful convictions from the 
data.
65
 
As this Article will show, however, the mechanisms that produce 
exonerations in the police scandal cases differ substantially from those in 
other sorts of cases where exonerations have been most common. In trying 
to understand the role of police misconduct in causing wrongful 
convictions, then, it is imperative to deploy a narrow lens.  
It is impossible to know how frequently police misconduct of the type 
uncovered in Rampart and Tulia occurs, or how many wrongful 
convictions result from such misconduct. What happened in Rampart and 
Tulia appears to have involved widespread misconduct by police officers 
and prosecutors. In these cases, investigators discovered a culture of 
corruption that fostered official misconduct. Even if instances in which 
entire police departments, or at least entire units within a department, 
succumb to such cultural corruption are rare, the type of misconduct that 
led to the wrongful conviction of defendants in Rampart and Tulia could 
just as easily be perpetrated by smaller groups of corrupt officers, or even 
by officers acting on their own. Wrongful convictions resulting from 
occasional police misconduct involving only a single officer, or a 
relatively small group of corrupt police officers, scattered throughout the 
nation’s police departments, would be almost impossible to detect. And 
yet, the aggregate effect of such misconduct could easily generate a very 
large number of wrongful convictions. It is also possible that such cases 
may truly be rare. We simply do not have any way to know. 
In either case, the lack of attention paid to date to the mass exoneration 
cases has tended to reinforce some misconceptions about the causes and 
characteristics of the convictions of innocent persons. The vast majority of 
exonerations studied to date arose from murder and rape cases, in which 
defendants received typically severe sentences—often long prison terms or 
death sentences. The vast majority of these exonerations—some 94%—
involved defendants who contested their guilt at trial and who were, as a 
result, able to pursue the full panoply of post-conviction remedies 
 
 
 64. Gross & Shaffer, supra note 6, at 9. 
 65. For example, based on this data some have concluded that the rate of false convictions is 
much lower among guilty pleas than trials. See, e.g., Larry Laudan, Is It Finally Time to Put ‘Proof 
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt’ Out to Pasture? 15 (U. of Tex. Public Law & Legal Theory Working 
Paper Series, Paper No. 194, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1815321. 
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available to them. These defendants make up an unrepresentative pool in a 
criminal justice system characterized by overwhelming rates of guilty 
pleas.
66
 As a result, while the exoneration data currently available tells us 
something about how innocent people can be convicted in rape and murder 
cases at trial, it tells us very little about how innocent people might agree 
to plead guilty in cases involving the more mundane criminal offenses that 
make up the bulk of criminal courts’ daily workloads. Little research to 
date illuminates this important corner of the wrongful convictions 
problem.
67
 
The present study seeks to partially rectify that problem in two ways. 
First, the study examines, to the extent available data permits, the causes 
and characteristics of the wrongful convictions identified in the mass 
exonerations. Second, the study contrasts that data with the data gathered 
in earlier exoneration studies to challenge some common assumptions 
about wrongful convictions more generally. By examining data from 
exonerations which arose in settings very different from the typical DNA-
based exonerations, my goal is to provide more nuance to our 
understanding of wrongful convictions, to debunk some suggested 
inferences from earlier data sets, and to identify new avenues for 
investigation and reform. 
IV. ACTUALLY INNOCENT RAMPART AND TULIA EXONEREES 
A. The Data 
The data used in this study comes from two well-publicized incidents 
of systematic police misconduct, the Rampart and Tulia scandals. Both 
incidents involved dozens of criminal defendants. More than 150 persons 
were exonerated as a result of Rampart, and thirty-seven as a result of 
Tulia.
68
 Unlike some other recent police misconduct scandals, 
 
 
 66. See, e.g., United States Sentencing Commission’s 2011 Annual Report, Chapter Five: 
Research 33 (2011), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_ 
Sourcebooks/2011/2011_Annual_Report_Chap5.pdf (reporting that 96.9% of federal felony 
convictions were the result of guilty pleas).  
 67. See Jon B. Gould & Richard A. Leo, One Hundred Years Later: Wrongful Convictions After 
a Century of Research, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 825, 834–35 (2010) (observing that “research 
offers few glimpses into errors” affecting “‘lesser’” felonies, and certainly misdemeanors”). 
 68. Thirty-five persons were pardoned by Texas Governor Rick Perry. Adam Liptak, Texas 
Governor Pardons 35 Arrested in Tainted Sting, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2003), http://www.ny 
times.com/2003/08/23/us/texas-governor-pardons-35-arrested-in-tainted-sting.html. Two others were 
exonerated by courts on petitions for habeas relief. See Ex parte Barrow, 2010 WL 2618851 (Tex. 
Crim. App., June 30, 2010); Janelle Stecklein, Judge reverses probation decision of Tulia brothers, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss4/2
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investigations of alleged police misconduct did not reveal wrongdoing 
until tens of defendants in Tulia, and hundreds in Rampart, had seen their 
cases through to conviction. Accordingly, the Rampart and Tulia cases 
provide an extensive set of data regarding not only how police misconduct 
can lead to wrongful arrest or wrongful charges, but to wrongful 
convictions. 
The vast bulk of the data on the Rampart scandal relied on in this study 
was extracted from files obtained from the Los Angeles District 
Attorney’s Office. These files contained office memoranda tracking 
developments in the Rampart investigation and most helpfully, writs filed 
by the District Attorney and defense counsel seeking relief for wrongfully 
convicted defendants. This data was supplemented with other information 
gleaned from official reports, newspaper articles, and other articles on the 
scandal appearing in the popular press and in academic commentary. With 
respect to Tulia, I relied extensively on the facts and case descriptions 
compiled by Nate Blakeslee in his thorough and engaging account of the 
Tulia scandal.
69
 I have cross-checked Blakeslee’s data, to the extent 
possible, with other published reports about Tulia, and with data made 
available to me by attorneys involved in the Tulia cases.  
Of the two, the Rampart material provides the greatest insight into how 
police misconduct “on the ground” can trigger a disastrous chain of events 
for innocent persons directly resulting in criminal convictions. Because the 
writs filed on behalf of wrongly convicted Rampart defendants often 
included narrative accounts of the circumstances of arrest, the Rampart 
cases provide an illuminating glossary of the many ways that police 
misconduct can lead to wrongful convictions. Study of these cases in the 
aggregate provides a fairly detailed empirical picture of wrongful 
convictions resulting from dishonest policing. The data pertaining to the 
Tulia cases shows less variation in the factual circumstances surrounding 
the charges, primarily because of the relatively uniform way in which the 
Tulia convictions were generated: each Tulia defendant was convicted 
based almost exclusively on the uncorroborated testimony of a single 
corrupt undercover agent. However, the Tulia data permits useful 
observations about the adjudicative procedures in such cases, and deepens 
the data pool in this regard. 
 
 
AMARILLO GLOBE-NEWS (Feb. 5, 2011), http://amarillo.com/news/local-news/2011-02-05/decision-
reversed-tulians. 
 69. NATE BLAKESLEE, TULIA: RACE, COCAINE, AND CORRUPTION IN A SMALL TEXAS TOWN 
409–17 (2005). 
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The data breaks down as follows. Although more than 150 
exonerations resulted from the Rampart scandal, the District Attorney’s 
files contained case-specific data for only ninety-seven of those cases, and 
detailed case data as to eighty-seven of these. None of the case 
information was complete in any sense of the word.
70
 As a result, there is 
more information about some cases than others, depending on the extent 
of factual detail provided in the affidavits and writs for habeas corpus.  
Not all of the individuals whose convictions were reversed or vacated, 
however, were “actually innocent” of the crimes for which they were 
convicted. Many defendants obtaining relief in Rampart did so because of 
procedural misconduct on the part of the police, not because the police 
were without evidence of wrongdoing. For example, many Rampart 
defendants were exonerated when it became clear that the police officers 
who had arrested them lied about the circumstances leading to the 
discovery of contraband. Where evidence of this sort of police misconduct 
surfaced convictions were rightly reversed, but there is no reason to 
believe that these defendants were not in fact engaged in criminal conduct. 
Prior exoneration studies have focused on cases involving what often is 
referred to as “actual” or “factual” innocence.71 Actual innocence cases are 
those in which either the wrong person was convicted of a crime 
committed by another, or a person was convicted of a crime that did not 
actually occur.
72
 In the first Gross study, all 340 exonerees had been 
absolved through “an official act declaring a defendant not guilty of a 
crime for which he or she had previously been convicted”73 premised on 
“strong evidence of factual innocence” and no “unexplained physical 
evidence of the defendant’s guilt.”74 The first Gross Study excluded from 
its purview exonerations in cases where the evidence indicated that the 
exonerees had been “involved in the crimes for which they were 
convicted.”75 The Garrett Study similarly focused only on those who “did 
 
 
 70. The D.A.’s office has maintained files from the Rampart cases, but the information was not 
well-organized and consisted mostly of the legal pleadings prepared in habeas corpus proceedings. We 
did not have access to the investigative files in individual cases. Useful information that might further 
clarify the circumstances in these cases no doubt could be found in such files, if they exist. In any 
event, we did not have access to them. 
 71. See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual 
Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761 (2007). 
 72. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 615 (1998) (“Actual innocence means factual 
innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.”). 
 73. Gross, supra note 2, at 524. 
 74. Id. at 524 n.4. 
 75. Id. at 527. 
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not commit the charged crime,”76 adopting the criteria used by the 
Innocence Project to identify its set of innocent exonerees.
77
 
Accordingly, I subdivided the Rampart cases into three categories: the 
“actually innocent” group, the “maybe innocent” group, and the “not 
innocent” group. In making these divisions, I followed Gross and Garrett 
in defining an actually innocent exoneree as one who was not involved in 
the commission of the supposed crime, did not commit the charged crime, 
or who was convicted of a crime that never occurred.  
In assigning the Rampart exonerees to these various groups, I relied 
heavily on the factual findings presented to reviewing courts by the 
District Attorney’s Office in petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed by 
the state, conceding the wrongful conviction and seeking the release of the 
defendant. I also relied on the factual statements included in the 
declarations and affidavits filed by investigating agents accompanying the 
D.A.’s filings. Where habeas petitions were initiated by defendants, I 
relied on factual allegations made by the petitioners only where those 
allegations were conceded in the state’s response. I also only assumed the 
truth of factual allegations made by defendants and their witnesses if the 
D.A.’s Office affirmatively stated in its filings that prosecutors or 
investigators had discovered evidence corroborating those accounts.  
Based on my review of the files, misconduct unrelated to the factual 
guilt or innocence of the defendant seems to have been the primary basis 
for exonerations in forty-nine cases.
78
 In those cases, defendants were 
exonerated because police officers lied about probable cause, about where 
a search took place, or about whether the suspect consented to a search. In 
thirty-eight cases, however, the police misconduct plainly did implicate 
the guilt/innocence determination. In these cases, police planted drugs or 
guns on suspects, lied about observing defendants committing crimes, or 
coerced confessions from innocent individuals. Where convictions were 
reversed based on reliable evidence of such misconduct, they constitute 
“exonerations” in the fullest sense of the term and are consistent with the 
 
 
 76. Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1645 (2008). 
 77. GARRETT, supra note 59, at 285–86 (explaining that the list of 250 DNA exonerations 
matches that maintained by the Innocence Project, which conservatively defines DNA exonerations 
by, for example, omitting “cases in which there has been no exoneration despite DNA evidence of 
innocence,” and only includes cases in which there is no doubt that the “convicts are actually 
innocent”). 
 78. In twenty-seven cases, defendants were exonerated for procedural misconduct by the police, 
but there remained evidence of criminal culpability on the part of the defendants. Exonerees in these 
cases were coded as “not innocent.” In another twenty-two cases, the guilt or innocence of the 
exonerees was not clear from the record. These cases were coded as “maybe innocent.” For a further 
discussion, see infra Part VI. 
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criteria used by others, including Gross and Garrett, who have studied the 
wrongful convictions of innocent persons. This study thus focuses 
primarily on those thirty-eight cases.  
Tulia supplies another thirty-seven cases. Thirty-five Tulia 
exonerations resulted from pardons recommended by Texas Governor 
Rick Perry. Two defendants were granted writs of habeas corpus vacating 
their convictions. Several other defendants were also wrongly charged or 
convicted in the scandal but were never pardoned. One such defendant was 
a minor who was sent to boot camp and who had already completed his 
sentence when Governor Perry recommended the Tulia pardons. Other 
defendants negotiated deals for deferred adjudication. Because convictions 
were never formally entered in those cases, pardons were not deemed 
necessary. Although these defendants too were wrongfully convicted, they 
were not included in the study because no official exonerations were ever 
granted in their cases.
79
 
There are those who continue to assert that at least some of the Tulia 
defendants were, in fact, guilty. Indeed, about a half-dozen of the Tulia 
defendants admitted that they helped undercover agent Coleman purchase 
crack cocaine.
80
 None of the defendants, however, ever admitted 
involvement in the sale of powder cocaine, and it was the powder cocaine 
charges that provided the basis for the most serious sentences imposed on 
the Tulia defendants. Differentiating among Tulia defendants is made 
more difficult because the Tulia defendants were pardoned en masse, 
based on the fact that the cases were uniformly predicated on the word of a 
proven liar, and thus no formal individual findings of innocence were ever 
made. However, what evidence we do have points strongly toward 
innocence of virtually all of the Tulia defendants. First, in a sting resulting 
in the arrest of forty-six individuals, where most arrests occurred in the 
early morning hours, by surprise, at the suspects’ homes, not a single 
suspect was caught in possession of cocaine or crack.
81
 Second, none of 
the alleged drug transactions were recorded on audio or video tape. 
Indeed, there was virtually no corroborating evidence presented to 
implicate any of the defendants in the charged crimes. Third, the charges 
were relatively implausible by their nature. The defendants were drawn 
 
 
 79. At least one person wrongfully charged in the Tulia drug sting, Etta Kelly, did not receive a 
pardon because she pleaded guilty in exchange for deferred adjudication and thus a conviction was 
never actually entered in her case. See John Reynolds, Pardons Urged in Drug Cases, LUBBOCK 
AVALANCHE-J. (July 31, 2003), http://lubbockonline.com/stories/073103/reg_073103064.shtml. 
 80. BLAKESLEE, supra note 30, at 296. 
 81. See Herbert, supra note 29. 
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from Tulia’s poorest classes where the drug of choice was crack cocaine. 
Yet all of the alleged transactions involved small amounts of powder 
cocaine. These facts strongly undermine the credibility of the charges and 
support the theory that Tom Coleman, the investigating undercover 
officer, may have been scamming the Drug Task Force for money by 
claiming to have engaged in fake sales and then logging into evidence 
powder cocaine that he himself severely diluted.
82
 In short, while it is 
possible that one or two of the Tulia defendants were in fact guilty, 
substantial evidence demonstrates that the vast majority of the Tulia 
defendants were innocent of any criminal wrongdoing, and the 
exonerations granted them by the Texas governor based on this evidence is 
sufficient to bring all of the Tulia defendants within the category of the 
“actually innocent.” 
B. Rampart and Tulia Exoneree Demographics 
The vast majority of those wrongfully convicted in Rampart and Tulia 
were persons of color. Although the data available for this study did not 
specify race or ethnicity of the Rampart defendants, an informal review of 
the surnames of the defendants strongly suggests that most, if not all, of 
the Rampart exonerees were of Hispanic origin. That conclusion fits with 
the population of the Rampart area, which is heavily Hispanic,
83
 and the 
demographics of the Rampart area street gangs that the CRASH unit at the 
center of the Rampart scandal policed.  
More precise data exists with respect to the Tulia defendants, the 
overwhelming majority of whom were persons of color. Of the thirty-five 
Tulia defendants who received pardons, thirty-one were black, two were 
Hispanic, and two were white. 
The average age of the Tulia exonerees was 29.8 years. There was 
insufficient data to determine the average age of the Rampart exonerees.
84
 
With respect to gender, as is true in criminal law generally, the great 
 
 
 82. Coleman was subsequently convicted of perjury for false testimony given during hearings of 
Tulia defendants. See Steve Barnes, Rogue Narcotics Agent in Texas Is Found Guilty of Perjury, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 15, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/15/national/15tulia.html?ref=tomcoleman. 
 83. One 2010 study of the area reported that 63% of Rampart’s residents are Latino, 26% are 
Asian-American, and 5% are African-American. The dominant ethnic groups in Rampart are 
Mexicans, Salvadorans, and Guatemalans. THE URBAN INSTITUTE, EVALUATION OF THE LOS ANGELES 
GANG REDUCTION AND YOUTH DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM: RAMPART ZONE PROFILE 2 (2010), 
available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412274-Rampart.pdf. The two most violent gangs 
operating in Rampart are 18th Street and Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13. Both gangs recruit heavily, if 
not exclusively, from Latinos. Id. at 3. 
 84. See Summary of Data (on file with author). 
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majority of the exonerees from the Rampart and Tulia scandals were male. 
Of ninety-seven Rampart exonerees, approximately 90% were male.
85
 
Interestingly, among the Rampart exonerees determined in this study to be 
“actually innocent,” all were male.86 Although there is no definitive 
answer as to why there were no females among the actually innocent 
Rampart exonerees, it is possible to speculate. The strong gender disparity 
might reflect an array of factors, including the fact that street gangs are 
predominantly, if not exclusively, male organizations; that the CRASH 
unit’s specific mission was to target gang activity in Rampart; and that 
females tend less often to be involved in the types of activities—street-
level drug dealing and armed conflict—around which most of the false 
allegations arose. It might also be the case that false uncorroborated 
allegations of wrongdoing by males are more plausible than similar 
allegations against females, and thus dishonest police trying to lie credibly 
are more likely to make such allegations against male suspects. 
A somewhat larger percentage—19% (7/37)—of exonerated 
defendants in Tulia were female. An even larger percentage—24% 
(11/47)—of the total Tulia defendants were female.87 The somewhat 
smaller percentage of women who received pardons reflects the fact that 
more women had their cases dismissed prior to prosecution, negotiated a 
deferred prosecution, or otherwise avoided receiving the type of lengthy 
prison sentence for which a pardon was needed. 
C. Offenses of Conviction 
The types of crimes leading to wrongful convictions in the mass 
exoneration cases are strikingly different from those leading to 
exonerations in other cases. Whereas most known exonerees typically 
have been convicted of rape or murder, the vast majority of the exonerees 
in the police scandal cases were convicted of relatively low-level drug 
crimes. All thirty-seven of the Tulia exonerees were convicted of drug 
crimes,
88
 while nearly half of the actually innocent Rampart exonerees 
(18/38) were convicted of drug crimes.
89
 In addition, an almost equal 
number of actually innocent Rampart exonerees (16) were convicted of 
 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See BLAKESLEE, supra note 30, at 409–17 (providing list of defendants). 
 88. Drug crimes here refer to any narcotics offense, including possession, transportion, and 
trafficking, of illegal narcotics, usually cocaine, crack cocaine, and heroin. 
 89. See supra note 84.  
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gun possession offenses.
90
 Of these, defendants were most frequently 
charged as felons in possession of firearms, although California law 
provides a variety of unlawful gun possession offenses, making it unlawful 
for minors, gang members, probationers, and parolees to possess firearms 
as well.
91
 Actually innocent exonerees include persons convicted of each 
of these various offenses. A few were convicted of both drug and gun 
offenses. A larger number were initially charged with drug and gun 
offenses, but, through plea bargaining, negotiated a conviction on only one 
offense. Four of the actually innocent defendants also were convicted of 
assaulting police officers. Often, those convictions were enhanced with 
false allegations that the assailant used a gun or another deadly weapon to 
commit the assault. One Rampart exoneree was convicted of the offense of 
“giving false information to a police officer.”92 
What these offenses of conviction primarily have in common is that 
they are all easily manufactured by the arresting officers. Drugs and guns 
are easily planted and, once “found,” constitute completed offenses. To the 
extent there were alleged victims in any of these cases, the victims 
uniformly were police officers. In none of the cases was there a need to 
obtain any corroborating evidence or eyewitness testimony from persons 
other than police officers. As a result, it was easy for police to falsely 
charge suspects with commission of these crimes, and extremely difficult 
for defendants to defend against them. 
Most of the actually innocent Rampart exonerees received relatively 
light sentences. Several of the exonerees were sentenced only to terms of 
probation. Most were sentenced to short prison terms ranging from 6 
months to a few years. A few of the actually innocent defendants, 
however, received quite severe sentences. The median sentence of the 
actually innocent Rampart exonerees was two years. The average sentence 
was a little more than three years, and the disparity between the median 
and average sentence reflects the small number of severe sentences that 
were imposed on a few of the defendants. 
The most severe, and in many ways the most egregious, Rampart-
related sentence was imposed on Javier Ovando. In the case that probably 
did the most to trigger the Rampart scandal, police officers shot Ovando, 
then nineteen years old and a member of the 18th Street gang, four times 
 
 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id.  
 92. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2, In re James Edward Thomas, No. JJ04795 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. May 22, 2000). 
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in the neck and the chest.
93
 In official reports of the incident submitted by 
police officers Rafael Perez and Nino Durden, the officers claimed that 
Ovando had broken into a vacant apartment where Perez and Durden were 
conducting surveillance. Ovando allegedly was armed with a 
semiautomatic rifle and a “military-style ‘banana clip.’”94 The officers 
said, and later testified under oath, that they shot Ovando after he refused 
to comply with their order to put the weapon down.
95
 As a result of the 
shooting Ovando was left paralyzed from the waist down.
96
 Despite the 
severe injuries he suffered and the fact that he had no prior felony 
convictions, Ovando was charged with two counts of assault with a 
firearm on a police officer and one count of exhibiting a firearm in the 
presence of a police officer.
97
 Firearm use enhancements were also 
alleged. A jury convicted Ovando essentially as charged, and the court 
sentenced him to twenty-three years and four months in state prison.
98
 
The allegations regarding Ovando’s conduct, however, were pure 
fiction. Officer Perez subsequently admitted in a deposition that Ovando 
was unarmed at the time of the shooting, that the shooting was 
unprovoked, and that he and Officer Durden had planted a gun on Ovando 
to cover up that fact.
99
 According to Perez, the gun planted on Ovando had 
been obtained during a “gang sweep” a few days prior to the incident,100 
and the serial number had been filed off so that the officers could use the 
weapon as a “throwaway.”101 Perez further stated that the gun was wiped 
clean of prints by the officers before it was placed next to the injured 
man.
102
 Thus, Ovando had the double misfortune of being shot and 
paralyzed, and then convicted of a serious crime he did not commit. 
Apart from the Ovando case, the longest Rampart sentences were 
imposed in drug cases. Russell Newman was sentenced to twelve years, 
 
 
 93. For a news analysis discussing details of the case, see Lou Cannon, One Bad Cop, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2000, at SM32.  
 94. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Ex. A at 2, Decl. of Richard A. Rosenthal, In re Javier 
Francisco Ovando, No. BA139642 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 16, 1999). 
 95. See Cannon, supra note 93. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Rosenthal Decl., supra note 94, at 2. 
 99. Id. at 3. 
 100. Id., Ex. B at 1–2. The reasons for the shooting remain unclear. Perez testified that Durden 
shot Ovando during the course of an argument, and that he shot Ovando “reflexively.” Others have 
speculated that after Durden shot Ovando, Perez “tried to finish off Ovando so that there would be no 
witness to the crime.” Cannon, supra note 93, at SM37. Ovando himself has little recollection of the 
shooting, and “still has no idea why the officers shot him.” Id. 
 101. Cannon, supra note 93, at *5. 
 102. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss4/2
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Esaw Booker to nine years, and Walter Rivas to seven years, all for 
allegedly dealing cocaine.
103
 
In comparison, the Tulia cases resulted in substantially harsher 
sentences. All of the Tulia defendants were convicted of selling small 
quantities of powder cocaine. Despite the small quantities, many of the 
defendants received draconian sentences, often as a result of prior felony 
convictions. William Cash and Joe Moore both received prison sentences 
in excess of ninety years. Kareem Abdul Jabbar White was sentenced to 
sixty years. Jason Jerome Williams and Kizzie White received sentences 
of forty-five and twenty-five years, respectively. The average sentence of 
the exonerated Tulia defendants was 157.8 months or a little over thirteen 
years. The median sentence, however, was thirty-six months, which was 
well below the average sentence primarily because of the large number of 
defendants who were sentenced to extended terms of probation in lieu of 
prison.
104
 Two defendants, Mandis and Landis Barrow, spent ten years in 
jail as a result of a probation revocation before a Texas court granted their 
habeas writ and ordered them released.
105
 
D. Causes of Wrongful Conviction 
While the leading identified cause of wrongful convictions in past 
studies of exonerations is witness misidentification, a very different 
dynamic is at work in the police misconduct cases. Police misconduct 
generally, and perjury in particular, was the primary cause of wrongful 
convictions in every Rampart and Tulia case resulting in exonerations. 
Witness misidentifications played virtually no role in any of the cases.  
Police misconduct in these scandals took many forms. Police officers 
filed false police reports detailing observations of criminal conduct the 
defendants never engaged in, or describing circumstances that if true 
would have established criminal conduct. In most of the cases, police 
either physically planted drugs or weapons on the defendants and then lied 
about how they found the contraband, or simply misstated that they had 
 
 
 103. See Resp. to Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2, In re Russell Newman, No. BA050279-01 
(Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 27, 2000); Resp. to Federal Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2, In re Esaw 
Booker, No. BA057055-02 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 2000); Resp. to Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 
2, In re Walter Rivas, No. BA165829 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 2000). 
 104. For purposes of calculating average and median figures, sentences of probation were treated 
as the equivalent of zero jail time. Because a later violation can result in a probationer serving the 
entire term in jail, the numbers understate actual punishment. 
 105. Janelle Stecklein, Judge reverses probation decision of Tulia brothers, AMARILLO GLOBE-
NEWS (Feb. 5, 2011, 1:12 AM), http://amarillo.com/news/local-news/2011-02-05/decision-reversed-
tulians. 
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found drugs or weapons when they had not. Police officers then testified to 
these same false facts at preliminary hearings and at trial in those rare 
cases that did not end in guilty pleas. For example, Emmanuel Chavez was 
arrested and ultimately convicted of possession of a firearm by a minor.
106
 
In the arrest report, Officer Perez stated that “he and his partners 
observed” Emmanuel Chavez pass “a sawed-off shotgun” to another minor 
named Sergio Salcido.
107
 According to later evidence gathered by 
investigators, however, police never saw either minor handle a gun. 
Instead, Chavez and Salcido were stopped because police knew them to be 
members of a “tagging crew.”108 As Perez frisked Salcido, a gun dropped 
down Salcido’s pant leg and struck the pavement. The officers then made 
up a story that allowed them to charge Chavez as well as Salcido for 
possession of the gun.
109
  
Similar police misconduct led to the wrongful conviction of Diego 
Barrios. Barrios and several others were socializing in the parking lot of a 
Jack-In-the-Box fast food restaurant when a “police car drove up to the 
group and shined its high-beam lights on the group.”110 The officers 
ordered everyone in the group to kneel down. They then searched and 
questioned each person. Four persons, including a juvenile by the name of 
Raymond C., were placed into a police car and taken to the police station. 
Unknown to the police, Raymond C. had a handgun in his possession at 
the time which he deposited, during the ride, behind the back seat of the 
squad car.
111
 Police discovered the gun after searching the car at the station 
and demanded to know who had dropped the gun. Raymond C. admitted 
the gun was his, but according to Barrios, “the officers said they did not 
‘want’ a juvenile,” and instead “‘put the gun’ on Barrios.”112 Barrios pled 
guilty to a charge of unlawful gun possession.  
On a different occasion, police approached another group of youths in a 
parking lot. After police recovered a handgun from underneath a parked 
car, they arrested one of the youths and brought him to the station where 
they asked him, among other things, who owned the gun. When he failed 
 
 
 106. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2, In re Emmanuel Chavez, No. FJ10183 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Feb. 23, 2000). 
 107. Id., Ex. A at 1.  
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Return and Answer to Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, at 9–11, Decl. of Michael Gannon, In 
re Diego Barrios, No. BA126209 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 13, 2000) (recounting statements made by 
several witnesses). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 11. 
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to provide an answer, the interrogating officer “told him that he was going 
to jail for the gun and rubbed it against Lobos’ fingers.”113 Lobos pled 
guilty at his arraignment to a charge of unlawful possession of a firearm 
by a felon.
114
  
In these cases, contraband discovered by police in the possession of 
one person, or an unknown person, was attributed to others in order to 
permit an arrest to be made or to facilitate additional arrests. In other 
cases, police planted guns or drugs obtained elsewhere on suspects, or 
simply claimed that they found guns or drugs on suspects who in fact were 
not in possession of them.
115
 This is precisely what officers did in the 
Ovando case, where, after shooting Ovando, the officers planted a weapon 
on him picked up elsewhere to falsely implicate him in criminal conduct 
and cover up their own misdeeds.
116
 
Other examples include the case of Ivan Oliver, who was charged with 
unlawful possession of a gun after police raided a party at which he was 
present. In Oliver’s case, police searched the residence where the party 
was held and located several guns. One officer then, investigators 
concluded, “arbitrarily decided who would be arrested for possessing 
them,” while other “CRASH officers created scenarios accounting for the 
recovery of each gun and . . . wrote the arrest report accordingly.”117 In 
several cases, defendants did not even know what offenses they were 
alleged to have committed until long after being arrested. One defendant, 
who was charged with narcotics possession, stated that he “did not find out 
why he was being arrested until he got to the jail and asked a jailer to tell 
him what his ‘pink slip’ indicated.”118 
 
 
 113. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Ex. B, Decl. of Brian Tyndall, In re Allan Manrique Lobos, 
No. BA 131378 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000). 
 114. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, In re Allan Manrique Lobos, No. BA 131378 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. Jan. 31, 2000). 
 115. A gun was planted on Jose Armando Lara, for instance, by Officer Durden, and the weapon 
was booked into evidence only after Durden obliterated the serial number. See Pet. for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus, Ex. A at 1, Decl. of Richard A. Rosenthal, In re Jose Armando Lara, No. BA145000 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 2000). 
 116. See id. at 2.  
 117. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Ex. A at 1, Decl. of Laura Laesecke, In re Ivan Oliver, No. 
BA135752 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 11, 2000). 
 118. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Ex. B at 1–2, Decl. of Brian Tyndall, In re Carlos Guevara, 
No. BA165829 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 2000). Another Rampart exoneree, Rene Matlong, similarly 
stated that “he had no idea he had been arrested for possession of a gun until he was given his 
paperwork several hours later at the jail division.” Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Ex. B, Decl. of 
Brian Tyndall, In re Rene Barela Matlong, No. BA131589 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 14, 2000). Two other 
Rampart exonerees made almost identical allegations. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Decl. of Brian 
Tyndall, In re Juan Torrecillas, No. BA143145 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 7, 2000) (reporting that 
Torrecillas told investigators that “he had no idea he had been arrested for possession of cocaine” until 
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Although present in every Rampart case, police perjury was not the 
sole cause of the false convictions. In some cases, police coerced an 
individual to make false statements inculpating the defendant. George 
Alfaro, for instance, was arrested for violating a gang injunction based on 
such evidence.
119
 According to police officers, Alfaro and two other 
suspects were arrested after police recovered a baggie of rock cocaine at 
the scene.
120
 The officers claimed that one of the suspects admitted that he 
possessed the drugs for sale. Rampart investigators, however, concluded 
that the drugs were planted at the scene, and the officers coerced the 
admission.
121
 As a result of the incident, Alfaro’s probation was revoked 
and Alfaro was sentenced to two years in state prison.
122
 
In other cases, police simply falsely reported incriminating statements 
made by others. This happened in the case of Gregorio Lopez.
123
 Lopez 
and another man named Omar Alonso were arrested after police claimed 
they saw Alonso in possession of a magnetic key holder containing 
cocaine and Lopez attempt to discard a similar item. According to the 
arrest report, police searched Lopez and recovered a gun from his 
waistband. In fact, investigators found, the drugs said to belong to Lopez 
were planted, and the gun was found in his car rather than on his person. 
The prosecution’s case was also bolstered by inculpatory statements 
allegedly made by Alonso. No such statements, it turns out, were ever 
made, nor did the officers administer Miranda warnings as they claimed to 
have done.
124
 
 
 
informed of charges at jail); Answer to Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 9, Decl. of Barbara Moulton, 
In re Alex Umana, No. BA144035 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 22, 2000). These accounts of being framed 
match up with Officer Perez’s own statements about how police typically went about framing suspects. 
 “When we talk about planting or putting a case on someone, for some reason, some 
investigators or some attorneys have thought that we actually—I go into the car, take the three 
bindles [of drugs], lay it next to him and go, ‘See, that’s what you dropped.’  
 It’s not the way it works. I take them into custody, put them in the car, do whatever. And 
you know, when it’s time to book evidence, we go and get the evidence from our car. There’s 
no need to go and, you know, lay it on the ground next to them or put fingerprints on the 
baggies or anything like that. That’s just not the way it works.  
 We get the evidence when it’s needed and move forward.”  
McDermott, supra note 15 (quoting Rafael Perez at LAPD Board of Rights hearing on June 3, 2000). 
 119.  See Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2, In re George Kenneth Alfaro, No. BA159394 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000). 
 120. Id. at 6. 
 121. Id. at 2. 
 122. Id. at 2. 
 123. Lopez is an alias. His real name is Leonel Ramos Estrada. Because court papers refer to 
Estrada as Lopez, I use that name here. 
 124. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Decl. of Brian Tyndall, In re Omar Ramos Alonso and 
Leonel Ramos Estrada, No. BA148402 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 2000). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss4/2
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Several of the Rampart exonerees falsely confessed, or were reported 
to have done so. Clinton Harris, for example, was convicted of possession 
of a firearm by a felon after police reported that they had observed Harris 
wearing a gun in the waistband of his pants, and that he had admitted that 
the gun was his, saying “[d]amn, I knew I shouldn’t have bought the 
gun. . . .”125 In fact, Harris never made any such statement. At the time of 
arrest Harris was seated on the couch of a friend’s apartment. Police 
officers entered the apartment without consent and found a gun on a table. 
According to Officer Perez, they decided to attribute the gun to Harris 
“because he was an ex-con.”126 
Delbert Carrillo was arrested after police officers allegedly “‘noticed a 
large bulge in his front shirt pocket.’”127 The arresting officers explained 
in the police report:  
Knowing defendant to be on active parole and having a criminal 
history, we asked him what he had in his pocket (to ensure that it 
was not a weapon or narcotics). The defendant’s expression went 
from that of being calm to nervous, and he hesitantly reached into 
his pocket and removed a clear plastic baggy containing 
approximately nine white paper bindles, the type routinely used to 
package rock cocaine, and stated, “its [sic] rocks.” [W]e recovered 
the bag and found it to contain nine paper bindles, each one, 
containing approximately ten off-white wafers resembling rock 
cocaine.
128
 
After Carrillo was arrested, police obtained a signed statement reading, 
with original misspellings, as follows: 
I DelBert Carrillo contacted officer Cohan and BRehm to discouse a 
matter at the time I had cocane in my posseion. and Because I new 
them I thought It would not Be a proBlem. Officers then overed it in 
my Shirt pocket. DEC. I make this statement freely.
129
  
Carrillo was charged with possession for sale of cocaine base and 
ultimately pleaded guilty to an amended complaint that charged him with 
 
 
 125. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Decl. of Barbara Moulton, In re Clinton Harris, No. 
BA140224 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2000) (alterations in original). 
 126. Id., Ex. A, Decl. of Natasha S. Cooper, at 1. Harris allegedly admitted that he was in 
possession of a gun at the time of the arrest. 
 127. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 3, In re Delbert Carrillo, No. BA169722 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Sept. 8, 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at Ex. C (statement form attached to police report). 
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possession for sale of a controlled substance. He was sentenced to the 
statutory minimum term of two years. Carrillo later alleged that the drugs 
were planted and police officers coerced him into signing the statement by 
threatening to file additional charges against him if he refused.
130
 His 
conviction was vacated after the state discovered evidence corroborating 
Carrillo’s account of the incident.131  
In short, then, the primary “cause” of false convictions in the Rampart 
and Tulia scandals was police perjury, some form of which was present in 
100% of the cases. Innocent defendants who won exonerations primarily 
had been convicted in the first instance on the basis of the false reports and 
false testimony of corrupt police officers. That same police misconduct, 
however, was also responsible for the generation of other types of false 
evidence, including false witness statements and false confessions that 
supported the police officers’ false reports and perjurious testimony in 
court. 
After police perjury, the most common “causes” of false convictions 
were the false confessions generated through police misconduct. False 
confessions were present in about 13% of the Rampart cases. Interestingly, 
that figure is consistent with findings by Gross and Garrett on the 
approximate frequency of false confessions in wrongful conviction 
cases.
132
 While a substantial amount of commentary has focused on the 
problem of false confessions, and commentators have probed how 
innocent defendants might be induced to confess to crimes they did not 
commit, very little discussion exists regarding the problem of entirely 
fabricated confessions. Yet, as the Rampart cases show, some false 
confessions “occur” simply because police lie about what suspects actually 
said. 
When the mass exoneration data is added to the existing data regarding 
the causes of wrongful convictions, there is ample room to doubt the claim 
that witness misidentification is the leading cause of false convictions. 
Indeed, when the Rampart and Tulia cases are combined with the data 
gathered by Gross in his first study (which intentionally excluded these 
cases), perjury dislodges witness misidentification as the most prevalent 
cause of known wrongful convictions during the time period covered in 
 
 
 130. Answer to Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2, In re Delbert Carrillo, No. BA169722 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 2000). 
 131. See id. at 3. 
 132. Gross found false confessions in 15% of the 340 exonerations examined in his first study. 
Gross et al., supra note 54, at 544. Gross’ more comprehensive second study also found false 
confessions in 15% of the 873 cases. See Gross & Shaffer, supra note 4, at 40. Garrett found false 
confessions in 16% of the 250 DNA exoneration cases he studied. GARRETT, supra note 59, at 18. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss4/2
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the study. In the combined data set, perjury is a factor in 221 of the 415 
exonerations of innocent defendants occurring between 1989–2003. 
Witness misidentifications are a close second, factoring into 219 cases 
during this same period. Gross’ more comprehensive study, which 
includes mass exonerations in the data set, confirms that perjury and false 
accusation, and not witness misidentification, is known to be the leading 
factor contributing to wrongful convictions.
133
 
TABLE 1: CAUSES OF FALSE CONVICTIONS FOR EXONERATIONS 
 Gross Study 
(340) 
Mass Exon’s 
(75) 
Combined 
Total 
Eyewitness 
Mis-i.d. 
64% (219/340) 0% (0/75) 53% (219/415) 
Reported 
Perjury 
43% (146/340) 100% (75/75) 53% (221/415) 
False 
Confession 
15% (51/340) 13% (5/38)
134
 15% (56/378) 
 
While there of course is no way to know how generalizable these 
numbers are, the data does suggest that efforts to reform the criminal 
justice system in order to prevent wrongful convictions should include 
greater focus on the prevention of police misconduct. During the last 
decade, a major effort has been made to improve the reliability of lineup 
identification procedures. The revised data set suggests that those 
concerned with decreasing the incidence of wrongful convictions should 
devote similar attention to enhancing the integrity and reliability of police 
officer statements and testimony. 
E. Method of Conviction 
Perhaps the most striking insight to be drawn from the mass 
exoneration data concerns the high rate of guilty pleas seen in these cases, 
which provides strong evidence that the wrongful conviction problem 
extends to defendants who plead guilty as well defendants who contest 
guilt at trial. Earlier studies of exonerations found only a negligible 
number of innocents who were exonerated after pleading guilty. In Gross’ 
 
 
 133. Gross & Shaffer, supra note 4, at 40. 
 134. Excludes Tulia data because information about those investigations was not sufficient to 
make a determination. 
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first study of 340 exonerations, only twenty of the exonerees, or 
approximately 6%, pled guilty.
135
 The vast majority, about 94%, were 
convicted after a trial. Garrett’s data tell the same story. In Garrett’s study 
of 250 DNA exonerations, sixteen, or 6%, pled guilty. The rest were 
convicted at trial. This data has been interpreted by some to mean that 
innocent people generally do not plead guilty, or if they do, they do so 
only under extraordinary circumstances.
136
 
The accuracy of guilty pleas is a major determinant of the scope of the 
problem of wrongful convictions. After all, the vast majority of criminal 
convictions, upwards of 90%, are a result of guilty pleas.
137
 If innocent 
people do not plead guilty but rather insist on going to trial, then the upper 
estimate of wrongful convictions is bounded by the small proportion of 
persons overall who are convicted at trial. In other words, even if 100% of 
defendants who were convicted at trial were actually innocent, the 
wrongful conviction “rate” would still be only about 5%, since 
approximately 95% of all defendants plead guilty. If, on the other hand, 
the fact that a defendant pleads guilty provides no guarantee that the 
defendant is not actually innocent, then the potential magnitude of the 
wrongful conviction problem is many times greater. Even if the rate of 
false guilty pleas is low, the far-greater size of the guilty plea pool ensures 
that it adds up to a quantitatively large problem. 
1. Evidence that the Innocent Do Plead Guilty
138
 
It has long been apparent that the innocent do, on occasion, plead 
guilty.
139
 The more important question, however, is how often false guilty 
pleas occur, and how false guilty plea rates compare with false trial 
 
 
 135. Gross, supra note 2, at 536. 
 136. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen and Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 65, 71 
(2009) (concluding that false guilty plea rate is much lower than false conviction rate at trial based on 
evaluation of Garrett data). 
 137. See Sourcebook of criminal justice statistics online (2006), http://www.albany.edu/source 
book/pdf/t5462006.pdf. 
 138. See Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 11, Decl. of Brian Tyndall, In re Gerald Peters, No. 
BA131401 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 9, 2000) (reporting that “Peters plead[ed] guilty to the charges on the 
advice of his attorney because he believed he would face a stiffer penalty if he chose to fight the 
charges in a trial and lost”); Scott Glover & Matt Lait, 10 More Rampart Cases Voided, LA TIMES 
(Jan. 26, 2000), http://www.streetgangs.com/topics/rampart/012600more10.html (“Davalos, 41, an 
upholstery worker who served 91 days in jail. He said he only agreed to a plea bargain because he was 
threatened with eight to 16 years in prison.”). 
 139. For a list of sources discussing the problem of innocent persons pleading guilty, see Gabriel 
J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty 
Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 740 n.305 (2002). 
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conviction rates. If there ever was any real doubt that false guilty pleas can 
occur in large numbers, the Rampart and Tulia data put those doubts to 
rest, indicating that at least in some types of cases, innocent defendants are 
far more likely to be convicted through a guilty plea than at trial. In the 
Rampart cases not involving alleged probation violations, twenty-five of 
thirty-two exonerees pled guilty. In Tulia the numbers were about the 
same: twenty-seven of thirty-four. Overall, fifty-two of the exonerees, or 
81%, were convicted through guilty pleas, and twelve, or 19%, were 
convicted after trial. Those numbers represent a far more typical 
distribution of guilty pleas and trial convictions than was seen in the Gross 
and Garrett data, and provide strong reason to believe, notwithstanding 
prior exoneration studies showing a low incidence of guilty pleas among 
exonerees, that the problem of wrongful convictions is not contained to 
those who contest their guilt at trial.
140
 Indeed, the mass exoneration cases 
make clear that, at least with respect to the types of charges at issue in the 
Rampart and Tulia cases, the method of conviction makes very little 
difference to the reliability of the conviction. In Rampart and Tulia, 
wrongful convictions resulted from guilty pleas and trials alike, and as is 
true in the criminal justice system generally, guilty pleas accounted for the 
majority of the convictions. 
TABLE 2: METHOD OF CONVICTION OF EXONERATED DEFENDANTS 
 Gross Study Mass Exon’s Combined 
Total 
Guilty plea 6% (20/340) 81% (52/64) 18% (72/404) 
Trial conviction 94% (320/340) 19% (12/64) 82% (332/404) 
 
As Table 2 suggests, in comparison with other exonerees, the Rampart 
and Tulia exonerees pled guilty at much higher rates. The percentage of 
convictions obtained through guilty pleas, however, still falls short of the 
average. What is the significance of these numbers? On one hand, a trial 
rate approaching 20% in low level drug cases might seem remarkable. 
These are typically simple cases to prosecute and the vast majority of such 
cases undoubtedly would normally be resolved through guilty pleas. On 
the other hand, the evidence in many of these cases, especially the Tulia 
 
 
 140. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, supra note 136, at 71 (calculating wrongful 
conviction rate by guilty plea based on Garrett study data showing that 9/200 exonerees pled guilty). 
Michael Risinger critiques that reasoning in a responsive essay. See D. Michael Risinger, Tragic 
Consequences of Deadly Dilemmas: A Response to Allen and Laudan, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 991, 
995 (2010). 
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cases, was extremely weak. These were cases built on the testimony of a 
single undercover cop, with no electronic recording of the transactions or 
corroborating evidence, and in some cases in the face of significant alibi 
defenses. Given this, it is difficult to tell whether a 20% trial rate is high or 
low. Regardless, the fact that so many mass exoneration cases were 
resolved by guilty pleas should erode any perception that actually innocent 
defendants almost uniformly refused to plead guilty.  
Of course, it is possible that the Rampart and Tulia cases, rather than 
the exoneration cases studied by others, represent the outlier. There are 
several reasons, however, to believe that with respect to the frequency of 
false guilty pleas, the Rampart and Tulia cases provide a more typical 
distribution, and that wrongful convictions, like convictions generally, are 
usually the end product of a guilty plea rather than a trial verdict. First, as 
both Gross and Garrett acknowledge, cases resulting in exonerations are 
the beneficiaries of a phenomenally rare confluence of events that are 
simply not present in typical cases.
141
 For a DNA exoneration to occur, for 
example, the crime must have been one involving biological evidence, 
where that evidence is dispositive of the defendant’s guilt. That evidence 
must have been gathered but not tested, or not tested properly, preserved 
for years or decades, and located in quantities and in sufficient quality to 
permit testing, and defendants must have preserved the means to launch a 
legal challenge against their conviction once the evidence is discovered. 
The preconditions for exoneration after a trial conviction are only rarely 
satisfied; rarer still will they exist where the defendant pleads guilty. 
In guilty plea cases, the state is less likely to preserve evidence for later 
testing, and because no trial record exists, even where such evidence was 
preserved, it is difficult to assess the significance of exculpatory test 
results. Defendants who plead guilty typically waive their rights to appeal 
and to post-conviction review.
142
 As a result, innocent people who plead 
guilty almost invariably lack a viable procedural mechanism to prove their 
innocence in a post-conviction proceeding, at least absent the type of 
extraordinary circumstances that occurred in Rampart and Tulia. To make 
matters worse, many statutes governing access to post-conviction DNA 
 
 
 141. See, e.g., Gross & Shaffer, supra note 6, at 4–5 (explaining how exonerations tend to be the 
product of “blind luck” or “improbable chains of happenstance”). 
 142. See Nancy J. King, Appeal Waivers And The Future Of Sentencing Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 
209 (2011) (finding in her empirical study that defendants who pleaded guilty waived their right to 
appeal in nearly two-thirds of cases). 
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testing specifically preclude defendants who plead guilty from obtaining 
testing.
143
 
There is good reason, moreover, to view the mass exoneration cases as 
far more typical of garden-variety wrongful convictions than the cases 
included in the earlier Gross and Garrett studies, a very large percentage of 
which (100% in the Garrett study) involved post-conviction DNA testing. 
In the Rampart and Tulia cases, most defendants were convicted of drug or 
gun crimes, which are far more common than the rape, murder, or rape-
murder convictions making up the vast majority of the earlier studied 
exoneration cases. Although some sentences were draconian, especially in 
Tulia, most sentences were relatively modest in severity, as are most 
felony sentences imposed on typical felony convicts. As noted above, 
most of the Rampart exonerees received relatively light sentences, with the 
average sentence being approximately three years, and the median 
sentence less than two years. These figures are consistent with national 
averages for state felons.
144
 In contrast, exonerees in the first Gross study 
had almost uniformly received harsh sentences for the most serious 
crimes. This was especially true among the non-DNA exonerations in the 
data pool, of which 85% (166/196) were serving sentences for murder or 
manslaughter, and 22% among all of the exonerees (74/340) were 
sentenced to death.
145
  
Moreover, the exonerations in Rampart and Tulia were largely the 
product of happenstance. The Rampart exonerations in particular involved 
run-of-the-mill drug and gun cases that never would have received even 
passing interest from the outside world had it not been for the cooperation 
deal struck by Rafael Perez. Unlike typical DNA exonerations, the 
exonerations in Rampart came about without the intervention of Innocence 
Projects or big-firm pro-bono advocacy. There were few trial transcripts, 
physical evidence, or other compelling evidence from which a defendant’s 
actual innocence could be determined.
146
 The Tulia exonerations did 
benefit from substantial pro-bono advocacy, but one suspects that none of 
the events leading to the uncovering of misconduct in Tulia would have 
been uncovered had the extent of the misconduct not been as sweeping, 
the sentences not as draconian, and the racial component not as overt as it 
 
 
 143. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 925.11(1)(a)(2) (West 2006). But see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. 
ANN. art. 64.03(b) (West 2007). 
 144. See supra note 137. 
 145. Gross, supra note 2, at 531. 
 146. This, in part, was a necessary byproduct of a set of convictions obtained largely through plea 
bargains. 
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was. Setting aside the extraordinary manner in which the police 
misconduct was discovered, the kinds of convictions at issue in Rampart 
and Tulia were far more typical, substantively and procedurally, than those 
that have eventuated in DNA exonerations. 
V. EXPLAINING WRONGFUL PLEAS 
In addition to providing an empirical basis for the claim that innocent 
people plead guilty, the mass exoneration cases vividly illustrate how and 
why actually innocent defendants plead guilty. In general, there appear to 
have been three main factors driving innocent Rampart and Tulia 
defendants to plead guilty: an outsized trial penalty, a lack of viable 
strategies to contest the charges, and presumptively or actually 
unsympathetic forums. Each is considered briefly below. 
A. New Data on the Trial Penalty 
Without a doubt, the overwhelming reason that innocent Rampart and 
Tulia exonerees pleaded guilty to crimes they did not commit was that 
they feared that they would do much worse at trial if they did not plead 
guilty. Typical are the sentiments expressed by one innocent Rampart 
exoneree who on advice of his attorney pleaded guilty in exchange for a 
three-year term of probation, believing that “he would face a stiffer 
penalty if he chose to fight the charges in a trial and lost.”147 That exoneree 
likely was not wrong. The existence of a trial penalty has been long 
acknowledged, albeit bemoaned by many.
148
 It is an institutionalized 
feature of contemporary criminal justice. Nonetheless, the coercive impact 
of the trial penalty is unmistakable, and is plainly evident in the Rampart 
and Tulia cases. 
Tulia provides an extreme example of the coercive impact of the trial 
penalty. Of the thirty-seven innocent Tulia exonerees, seven went to trial 
and were convicted, twenty-seven pleaded guilty, one did both, and two 
 
 
 147. In re Gerald Peters, supra note 138. Peters also alleged that he was physically abused by 
officers in an interview, but that “he never made a complaint regarding this incident because he felt ‘it 
would do no good.’” Id. Similarly, two months after pleading guilty, Ruben Rojas had second thoughts 
and wrote a letter to the judge who had sentenced him. In the handwritten letter, Rojas explained that 
“I was informed that I was facing 25 years to life by my defense counsel and that there was no way I 
could have won my case because I was up against a police officer.” He added: “I never did what I was 
charged for. . . I’m not guilty.” Matt Lait, Another Inmate Set to Be Freed in Police Probe, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 17, 1999, at A1. 
 148. See, e.g., Candace McCoy, Plea Bargaining as Coercion: The Trial Penalty and Plea 
Bargaining Reform, 50 CRIM. L.Q. 67 (2005). 
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others had their probation revoked.
149
 The first defendant to go to trial, Joe 
Moore, was convicted and sentenced to ninety years in prison for allegedly 
dealing 4.5 grams of cocaine.
150
 Moore had been offered an opportunity to 
plead guilty in exchange for a twenty-five-year sentence (the minimum 
available given the charges and Moore’s prior record), but he declined.151 
Six more defendants stood trial, and were convictedand sentenced to 
prison terms ranging from 20 to 361 years.
152
 In light of this precedent, 
and with cases substantively indistinguishable in terms of the nature of the 
charges and the strength of the evidence, the remaining defendants all 
chose to plead guilty.
153
 Although the sentences imposed on those who 
pleaded guilty in Tulia were often quite harsh, the harshness of their 
sentences paled in comparison to those who were convicted at trial. On 
average, Tulia defendants who pleaded guilty were sentenced to 
approximately four years in prison.
154
 The Tulia defendants who contested 
their guilt at trial received an average sentence of 615.4 months, or 51.3 
years.
155
 Trial sentences at Tulia, in other words, were nearly thirteen 
times harsher than sentences imposed following guilty pleas. 
The trial penalty evident in Tulia might be attributed, at least in part, to 
an apparently intentional prosecutorial strategy to frighten defendants into 
foregoing trial. Such an express strategy was made easier in small-town 
Tulia, where word of harsh sentences quickly spread among Tulia’s small 
defense bar and the defendants themselves. 
These dynamics were noticeably absent in Rampart. Unlike Tulia, there 
is no indication that prosecutors were aware of the defects in the cases 
they brought against innocent defendants. Indeed, after the scandal broke, 
the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office took affirmative steps to 
investigate the scope of wrongdoing and to vacate convictions resulting 
from police misconduct.
156
 In terms of size and population, the L.A. justice 
system also obviously dwarfs Tulia’s. There is far less reason to believe 
 
 
 149. Donald Wayne Smith was charged with seven drug trafficking offenses, and the prosecutor 
elected to try the cases separately. See BLAKESLEE, supra note 69, at 117. After Smith was convicted 
in the first case and sentenced to two years in prison, he accepted a plea offer to resolve the remaining 
charges in exchange for a 12.5 sentence to run concurrently with his other conviction. Id. at 136–37. 
 150. Id. at 59. 
 151. Id. at 48. 
 152. Cash Love was sentenced to 361 years by the trial court. Id. at 92. 
 153. See id. at 160–61. 
 154. See Summary of Data (on file with author). 
 155. Id. In calculating this figure, I counted Cash Love’s sentence as 99, rather than 361, years. I 
also omitted Smith’s case. Smith’s two-year sentence was based on the least serious of only one of 
seven charges. 
 156. See generally CONSTANCE L. RICE ET AL., RAMPART RECONSIDERED: THE SEARCH FOR 
REAL REFORM SEVEN YEARS LATER (2006). 
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that prosecutors sought to send any messages to specific classes of 
defendants by seeking harsh trial sentences. Any implicit threat inherent in 
the harsher trial sentences would seem to be endemic to the justice system 
in general. 
Nonetheless, the observable trial penalty in the Rampart cases, though 
not on the same order as the average trial penalty in Tulia, was still quite 
large. On average, actually innocent Rampart defendants who were 
convicted at trial were sentenced to 101.25 months, or nearly 8.5 years.
157
 
Actually innocent Rampart defendants who pleaded guilty were sentenced 
to an average term of 18.5 months, or just over 1.5 years.
158
 Defendants 
who contested their cases at trial, in other words, received sentences on 
average more than five times harsher than those who agreed to plead 
guilty.
159
 The trial penalty for the larger sample of all Rampart exonerees, 
including those who did not appear to be actually innocent, was even 
bigger. For this group, the average plea sentence was 20.3 months.
160
 The 
average trial sentence was 136.3 months.
161
 Trial sentences were therefore 
on average 6.7 times longer than plea sentences, with no apparent 
qualitative differences among the types of crimes charged or the criminal 
history of the defendants.
162
 
The longest sentence imposed on any Rampart exoneree was a term of 
fifty-four years to life, later reduced on appeal to twenty-nine years to life, 
 
 
 157. See Summary of Data (on file with author).  
 158. Id. 
 159. Arguably, one could object that these numbers are skewed by the inclusion of the Ovando 
case—by far the harshest sentence imposed in any of the Rampart cases. There are several reasons, 
however, to include that case in calculating the numbers. First, Ovando was not the only innocent 
Rampart exoneree to be charged with a crime of violence. Jose Perez was charged with assaulting a 
peace officer with a firearm, the same crime charged against Ovando, and pleaded guilty. Perez 
received a sentence of three-years probation. Raul Munoz and Cesar Natividad were also (falsely) 
charged with assaulting a peace officer with a deadly weapon—in their case—allegedly attempting to 
run over a police officer with a car. Both settled the cases by guilty plea. Munoz was sentenced to 
three-years prison, and Natividad was sentenced to a three year term of probation. None of these 
defendants suffered the kinds of serious injuries that Ovando did. Ovando’s trial sentence was thus 
about eight times harsher than the harshest plea sentence for comparable conduct, and if one treats a 
term of probation as equivalent to about one-third of a prison term, his trial sentence exceeded the 
average plea sentences in the three cases by 1400%. In Ovando’s case, prosecutors offered Ovando a 
thirteen-year deal to resolve the case, but Ovando’s lawyer thought the offer was “way too severe” and 
turned it down. Lou Cannon, One Bad Cop, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 1, 2000, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/01/magazine/one-bad-cop.html. 
 160. See supra note 159.  
 161. Id.  
 162. In calculating these figures, there were sixty-one plea sentences and twelve trial sentences 
included in the data. Sentencing data was unavailable in some of the cases. In other cases, defendants 
were never sentenced because they failed to appear, and a bench warrant issued. Terms of probation 
were not counted as punishment. Some defendants were deported as a result of their convictions. 
Deportation was also not counted as punishment in calculating average sentences. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss4/2
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for Lorenzo Nava. Like most of the other Rampart exonerees, Nava was 
convicted of drug and gun offenses and contested the charges at trial.
163
 
After conviction, Nava received an initial fifty-four-year sentence under 
California’s three-strikes law.164 Nava’s case, however, can be compared 
to Joseph Jones, another Rampart defendant, to show that the long trial 
sentence imposed on Nava was not simply a function of the three-strikes 
law or other factors unique to his case. Like Nava, Jones was charged with 
multiple drug counts and was potentially subject to prosecution under the 
three-strikes law. According to Detective Chris Barling, who interviewed 
Jones in the Rampart investigation, “Jones believed that he was facing a 
life term,” and notwithstanding his contention that he was innocent, 
decided to plead guilty on the advice of counsel.
165
 Pursuant to the plea, 
Jones was sentenced to a prison term of eight years.
166
 The disparity in 
sentence outcome between Nava and Jones is roughly consistent with the 
average trial penalty evident in the Rampart cases, amounting to at least a 
seven-fold penalty increase based on Nava’s initial trial sentence, and a 
four-fold penalty increase based on Nava’s reduced sentence on appeal.167 
This data provides further evidence that the real trial penalty could be 
far larger than estimated in some studies.
168
 With trial sentences ranging 
anywhere from four to thirteen times longer than plea sentences, the costs 
of contesting a typical felony charge are prohibitive. Few defendants can 
afford to run the risk. The experience of those wrongly convicted in the 
Rampart and Tulia scandals demonstrates that the coercive power of the 
 
 
 163. See Summary of Data (on file with author).  
 164. Id.  
 165. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Ex. B at 1, Decl. of Chris Barling, In re Joseph Jones, No. 
BA154853 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 10, 1999). 
 166. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2, In re Joseph Jones, No. BA154853 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 
10, 1999). 
 167. These numbers represent minimums because they ignore the upper end of the sentencing 
range (life) and are based on the minimum sentence that Nava was required to serve. 
 168. Hans Zeisel estimated that trial sentences were 42% more severe than guilty plea sentences. 
See Hans Zeisel, The Disposition of Felony Arrests, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 407, 444–49 (1981). 
Other scholars have reached varying estimates. See, e.g., Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects 
Punishment: Differences in Sentences After Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five 
Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 959 (2005) (finding that trial penalties varied from state to 
state, and offense to offense, ranging from 13% to 461%); Jeffery T. Ulmer & Mindy S. Bradley, 
Variation in Trial Penalties Among Serious Violent Offenses, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 631, 652 (2006) 
(finding that defendants convicted at trial received sentences 57% longer than defendants who pleaded 
guilty). The Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide a 35% discount for defendants who “accept 
responsibility.” Because of the variety of charge bargains that typically accompany federal plea 
bargains, actual discounts are almost always far larger than 35%. See Russell Covey, Reconsidering 
the Relationship Between Cognitive Psychology and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 213, 224–30 
(2007). 
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trial penalty causes innocent defendants as well as guilty ones to plead 
guilty. 
B. Lack of Effective Trial Strategies for Falsely Accused Defendants 
Time and again, actually innocent defendants asked by investigators to 
explain why they pled guilty repeated a common mantra: it was their word 
against that of the police, and who were the prosecutors, judges, or jurors 
going to believe?
169
 While this dynamic is present in most cases, it is 
especially likely to have an effect where defendants have reason to believe 
they will not be treated fairly. Most of the Rampart exonerees were gang 
members, some with criminal histories. They were likely correct in 
believing that few middle-class jurors would give credence to their claims 
of police misconduct. In Tulia, racial dynamics clearly affected the 
calculations of the black defendants, who assumed (correctly, given the 
trial outcomes) that their protestations of innocence would be ignored. In 
these cases, innocent defendants often had little except their own word to 
prove their innocence, and their word was demonstrably not enough. In 
part because of the nature of the cases, and in part because of their lack of 
resources, the defendants were typically unable to amass any credible 
exonerating evidence. Given that the police already had demonstrated a 
willingness to testify falsely,
170
 many defendants realized that a successful 
trial defense was unlikely and simply decided to cut their losses.  
C. Unsympathetic Forums 
A third reason so many innocent Tulia and Rampart defendants pled 
guilty, even in cases where the evidence was flimsy, was an undoubtedly 
accurate perception that the system itself was not constituted in a way 
likely to give them much chance of prevailing. As one blue ribbon panel 
observed after investigating the Rampart scandal, the Los Angeles County 
criminal justice system is characterized by “assembly-line” justice.171 
Many actors are complicit in pressuring innocent defendants to plead 
 
 
 169. See Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Decl. of Michael J. Hansen, In re William Zepeda and 
Argelia Diaz, No. BA156980 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 17, 2000) (reporting that Zepeda “decided to plead 
guilty to the charge after he realized it was just his word against the officers”). 
 170. For example, Rafael Zambrano, who was charged with violating probation for unlawful gun 
possession after police planted a gun on him, claimed that he “decided to plead guilty to the charge 
after Officer Rafael Perez testified at his preliminary hearing.” See Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Ex. 
B, Decl. of Brian Tyndall, In re Rafael Zambrano, No. BA138148 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 11, 2000). 
 171. RAMPART RECONSIDERED, supra note 16, at 49. 
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guilty to crimes they did not commit, including prosecutors who “pressure 
defendants to accept plea deals in extremely short time frames,” 
“overworked public defenders” who counsel their clients to accept those 
pleas, and judges who are quick to impose “draconian” sentences on those 
who “drain[] judicial resources by demanding a trial.”172 Moreover, 
prosecutors are reluctant to doubt the credibility of the police officers with 
whom they work daily, and judges “are unwilling or unable to pursue their 
own suspicions of police perjury or misconduct.”173 As a result, a falsely 
accused defendant has little reason to believe that he will fare well by 
going to trial, and has great reason to believe that he will be much worse 
off by refusing to take a plea and cut his losses. 
Ample evidence also suggests that judges often are biased toward the 
prosecution.
174
 A large part of the bench is populated by former 
prosecutors. These former prosecutors often have difficulty shedding their 
former roles. Regardless of background, judges often form relationships 
with prosecutors who appear regularly in their courtrooms, and many think 
of themselves as part of a “law-enforcement” team. In addition, electoral 
politics drive many judges to more pro-prosecution positions. Some judges 
even campaign overtly on being “tough on crime” or “hard on 
criminals.”175 Actually innocent defendants tried before such judges likely 
are often led to believe, probably correctly, that they will not get the 
benefit of the doubt should they go to trial. 
Arguably, pro-prosecution judges played an especially prominent part 
in many of the cases in which actually innocent defendants were convicted 
at trial. The two judges presiding over the Tulia prosecutions initially 
barred defense lawyers from impeaching undercover agent Tom 
Coleman’s character. After defense counsel discovered that Coleman had 
 
 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See, e.g., Susan D. Rozelle, Daubert, Schmaubert: Criminal Defendants and the Short End of 
the Science Stick, 43 TULSA L. REV. 597, 606 (2007) (arguing that judges admit dubious forensic 
science far more often on behalf of prosecutors than defendants); Rodney J. Uphoff, On Misjudging 
and Its Implications for Criminal Defendants, Their Lawyers and the Criminal Justice System, 7 NEV. 
L.J. 521, 529 (2007) (noting based on personal observation that “a significant number of judges with 
prior prosecutorial experience bring a decidedly pro-prosecution attitude to the bench, and that attitude 
invariably influences their decisionmaking”); Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges: “Tough on 
Crime,” Soft on Strategy, Ripe for Disqualification, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 317 (2010) (arguing that elected 
judges are biased against defendants and “tough on crime” prosecutors should recuse themselves in 
criminal cases under ethics rules). 
 175. Swisher, supra note 174, at 328–29 (quoting numerous expressions of overt bias in judges 
electoral campaigns, including one pledge from a Texas Court of Appeals judge who asserted “I’m a 
prosecution-oriented person” who “see[s] legal issues from the perspective of the state instead of the 
perspective of the defense” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1172 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:1133 
 
 
 
 
been charged with theft in a neighboring county during the same time 
period in which the undercover operation was conducted, the judges still 
barred the defense from putting any of that evidence before a jury, thereby 
effectively precluding defendants from presenting their theory of the 
case.
176
 In the Rampart trial of Javier Ovando, the presiding judge made a 
similar ruling against the defense, precluding Ovando’s attorney from 
attempting to impeach Officers Perez and Durden with discrepancies 
between contemporaneous statements given by them to investigators and a 
new account of events proffered at trial.
177
 Decisions by trial judges to 
preclude defendants from introducing evidence calling into question the 
honesty and integrity of the police or challenging substantial 
inconsistencies in the prosecution case were a major part of the Rampart 
and Tulia stories, and a clear contributing cause to many of the wrongful 
convictions that occurred. 
D. Innocence as a Minor Factor in Plea Bargaining 
Although the empirical evidence from the mass exoneration cases 
leaves no doubt that innocent defendants plead guilty, the question 
remains: does innocence have a measurable impact on whether a defendant 
will hold out for trial? Anecdotally speaking, we know that some innocent 
defendants turn down favorable plea bargains because of innocence. One 
Rampart exoneree to do so was Alex Umana. Umana was returning from a 
barbecue with his daughter and her mother when police stopped him and 
placed him among a group of four to six people who had been detained by 
police in the lobby of an apartment building. Although Umana was not in 
possession of any drugs at the time, he was nevertheless charged with 
possession of cocaine. Prosecutors offered a plea bargain for a 
probationary sentence, but Umana rejected the offer “because he was 
innocent and wanted to fight the charges.”178 Umana was convicted at trial 
and sentenced to five years in state prison.
179
 Several Tulia defendants also 
refused to plead guilty to drug charges because they were innocent. Take 
the case of Freddie Brookins, Jr., for example, who was accused of selling 
an eight-ball of powder cocaine to Coleman. Before trial, the prosecutor 
 
 
 176. See BLAKESLEE, supra note 30, at 100. 
 177. See Tamar Toister, Rampart Hasn’t Changed How Criminal Courts Do Business, L.A. 
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2000, available at 2000 WLNR 8421802. 
 178. Answer to Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 9, Decl. of Barbara Moulton, In re Alex Umana, 
No. BA144035 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 22, 2000). 
 179. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2, In re Alex Umana, No. BA144035 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 
6, 2000). 
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offered Brookins a plea of five years.
180
 The maximum sentence for the 
offense was twenty years. Brookins discussed the offer with his father, and 
the following colloquy reportedly occurred: “Did you do it,” his father 
asked him. “No, I didn’t,” Brookins replied. “Well then,” his father 
responded, “don’t take the deal.”181 Against the advice of counsel, 
Brookins declined the plea offer. He went to trial, was convicted, and was 
sentenced to the maximum term of twenty years.
182
 
Although we know that some defendants decline plea offers because of 
innocence, it is also possible that other innocent defendants plead guilty at 
equal or higher rates to avoid draconian trial penalties. The question 
therefore remains: does innocence materially alter guilty plea rates? The 
Rampart data sheds some additional light. For the purposes of this 
analysis, I identified three groups of Rampart cases resulting in 
exonerations. The first group, discussed above, consisted of those who 
were actually innocent of the crimes of conviction. There were thirty-eight 
such defendants in the data set. Of the remaining forty-nine, twenty-seven 
were identified as clearly “not actually innocent.” This group consisted of 
defendants who in fact were in possession of contraband or who admitted 
that they were engaged in criminal conduct at the time of arrest, but whose 
convictions were reversed based on procedural violations. The remaining 
group of twenty-two consisted of defendants whose guilt or innocence 
remains unclear given the record evidence. I identify this group as the 
“may be innocent” group.  
Although the numbers are small, they are large enough to permit some 
tentative comparisons. With respect to plea rates, the data shows that 
innocence does appear to make some difference. Twenty-five actually 
innocent Rampart exonerees pleaded guilty, while seven were convicted at 
trial.
183
 Actually innocent exonerees thus pleaded guilty at a rate of 77%. 
In comparison, twenty-two of those who were not actually innocent pled 
guilty while three were convicted at trial. In other words, 88% of those 
who were not innocent pleaded guilty. Finally, of the remaining group of 
“may be innocents,” seventeen pled guilty while two were convicted at 
trial, providing an 89% guilty plea rate.
184
  
 
 
 180. BLAKESLEE, supra note 30, at 138, 148. 
 181. Id. at 148 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 182. Id. at 157. 
 183. The other seven had their probation revoked, or were minors who were adjudicated 
delinquent. 
 184. Of the rest, two admitted probation violations and 1 had his probation revoked. 
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It thus appears from the data that actual innocence does induce some 
defendants to refuse a guilty plea and hold out for trial, but that the 
incentive has only a marginal effect, leading the innocent to contest their 
cases at trial at an approximately 10% greater rate than those who are 
actually guilty. Nonetheless, the data underscore that the vast majority of 
the actually innocent resolve false charges against them by pleading guilty. 
Very few held out for trial, and, as the numbers above documenting the 
size of the trial penalty demonstrate, those who did and lost paid a heavy 
price for that decision.
185
 
VI. THE WRONGFULLY CONVICTED VS. THE ACTUALLY INNOCENT: DOES 
THE DISTINCTION MATTER? 
In the national dialogue about wrongful convictions, definitions of 
terms like “innocence,” “exonerated,” and “wrongfully convicted” have 
been contested. Has a person, convicted on the basis of unconstitutionally-
obtained evidence, been “wrongfully convicted”? The answer, technically, 
is yes, but commentators typically use terms like “legal innocence” to 
describe defendants whose convictions resulted from significant 
procedural error but who are not factually innocent, or at least cannot 
establish their factual innocence.
186
 Legally innocent defendants were 
“wrongfully convicted,” but typically are treated as occupying a lesser 
status in the wrongful conviction debates than those who are “factually” or 
“actually” innocent.  
The term “actually innocent” has tended to be reserved for those who 
succeed in establishing not only that their conviction was legally flawed, 
but that they did not engage in any significant criminal wrongdoing. 
Accordingly, both Gross and Garrett limited their datasets to those 
defendants who were both formally exonerated by official act declaring 
the defendant not guilty of the crime of conviction and who were “actually 
innocent.” By “actually innocent,” Gross and Garrett mean that the 
exoneration was based on evidence that the defendants “had no role in the 
crimes for which they were originally convicted.”187 Defendants who were 
 
 
 185. Of course, whether trial was a good or bad decision for the average innocent defendant 
falsely charged by corrupt Rampart officers is impossible to determine without information regarding 
acquittals and dismissals of such defendants, which is unavailable. The data does show that those who 
gamble on trial and lose fare far worse than those who plead guilty. 
 186. See Margaret Raymond, The Problem with Innocence, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 449, 456 (2001) 
(distinguishing between legal and factual innocence); Emily Hughes, Innocence Unmodified, 89 N.C. 
L. REV. 1083 (2011) (critiquing the distinction). 
 187. Gross et al., supra note 2, at 524. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss4/2
  
 
 
 
 
2013] POLICE MISCONDUCT 1175 
 
 
 
 
not guilty of the convicted offense, but who were guilty of committing 
some lesser crime based on the same conduct, are not considered actually 
innocent and are typically excluded from any count of exonerations.
188
 
All of the individuals who were included in the Gross and Garrett 
studies were thus persons whose convictions were formally vacated, either 
through pardon or court order, and who were able to produce strong 
evidence not only that the convictions in their cases were unreliable, but 
that they were affirmatively innocent of wrongdoing. Other commentators 
have also urged the importance of distinguishing between actually 
innocent and procedurally innocent defendants, because convictions of 
actually innocent people represent far more serious breakdowns in the 
truth-seeking function of the criminal process.
189
 Still, police misconduct 
remains troubling even where the victim of that misconduct is engaged in 
unlawful behavior. Such misconduct undermines the effectiveness of 
constitutional rules established to protect the bodily integrity, privacy, and 
autonomy of citizens from incursion by the state. When police evade these 
rules by lying about their conduct, they undermine those mechanisms and 
weaken the protections safeguarding the innocent and the guilty alike.  
A. Wrongful Convictions Resulting from Unconstitutional Police Conduct 
The primary aim of this article has been to use the Rampart and Tulia 
exonerations as a means to understand how police misconduct causes 
wrongful convictions. Accordingly, until now the article has focused on 
the Rampart and Tulia cases that meet the actual innocence criteria used 
by other researchers in studying known wrongful convictions. As 
discussed above, thirty-eight Rampart exonerees and thirty-seven Tulia 
 
 
 188. See id. at 524 n.4. Garrett’s study employed similar criteria, generally adopting the same 
screening mechanism—affirmative proof of innocence—used by the Innocence Project to identify 
potential clients. See GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT, supra note 59, at 285–86 (explaining that 
list of 250 DNA exonerations does not include “cases in which there has been no exoneration despite 
DNA evidence of innocence” and only includes cases in which there is no doubt that the “convicts are 
actually innocent”). 
 189. See Jon B. Gould & Richard A. Leo, One Hundred Years Later: Wrongful Convictions After 
a Century of Research, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 825, 833 (2010). At least one commentator 
has taken issue with the narrowness of the definition. In a forthcoming paper, Keith Findley argues 
that the criteria used to define the “actually innocent” is too narrow, at least where proof of innocence 
rather than absence of proof of guilt is demanded. Findley thus contends that all persons whose 
convictions are formally vacated based on evidence of innocence should be considered innocent. See 
Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1157 (2011). 
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exonerees meet these criteria.
190
 A list of all of the innocent Rampart and 
Tulia exonerees appears in the Appendix to this article. 
Forty-nine persons—all Rampart defendants—were excluded from the 
dataset notwithstanding the fact that their convictions were reversed or 
vacated by a court with the affirmative consent of the Los Angeles District 
Attorney on the basis of police misconduct. These defendants did not meet 
the actual innocence criteria because there either remained affirmative 
evidence of criminal wrongdoing or insufficient evidence of innocence in 
the records available for this study. Under the Gross criteria, these 
individuals were not “exonerated” in the relevant sense. There is no doubt, 
however, that they were wrongfully convicted. Their cases illustrate 
various ways in which police officers circumvent constitutional 
protections and then lie about their conduct in order to convict criminal 
defendants. I refer to this type of police misconduct as “procedural 
perjury.”  
B. Types of Police “Procedural Perjury” 
Procedural perjury occurs when police lie about the circumstances of 
an encounter in order to ensure that evidence obtained during the 
encounter is not excluded or excludable. Procedural perjury is a common 
enough problem that a word—“testilying”—has been coined to describe 
the phenomenon.
191
 In one survey, insiders in the criminal justice system 
estimated that police perjury occurs in 20% to 50% of all Fourth 
Amendment suppression hearings.
192
 Seventy-six percent of police officers 
also believed that police misrepresented the facts relevant to probable 
cause determinations.
193
 In general, procedural perjury arises in three main 
guises: lies about consent, lies about probable cause, and lies about 
compliance with other constitutional rules of criminal procedure, most 
commonly, the rules governing custodial interrogation set forth in 
Miranda v. Arizona.
194
 As I use the terms, procedural perjury differs from 
 
 
 190. See infra Part IV.A. One Tulia defendant, Jonathan Loftin, was a minor at the time of his 
wrongful conviction and did not receive a pardon because he had already served out his camp 
sentence. Although his case is indistinguishable from the other Tulia cases in every other respect, I 
have not included him in the dataset. 
 191. See generally I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835 (2008). 
 192. See Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 1037, 1041 (1996); see also Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater 
Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 107 (1992). 
 193. See Myron W. Orfield, Jr., The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of 
Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016, 1050 (1987). 
 194. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  
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substantive perjury in that when police commit procedural perjury, they lie 
to circumvent procedural rules that otherwise would prevent them from 
prosecuting apparently guilty suspects. Procedural perjury is a form of 
whitewashing that is intended to facilitate what most police officers likely 
perceive to be the most essential aspect of their jobs: to punish those who 
are believed to be committing or to have committed crimes. Substantive 
perjury, in contrast, occurs when police lie to incriminate innocent 
persons. From the perspective of the criminal justice system’s 
guilt/innocence sorting mechanism, substantive perjury is a far more 
destructive practice than procedural perjury, although both forms of 
perjury undermine the integrity of the criminal justice system and diminish 
the credibility and the legitimacy of the police. 
A New York state commission headed by Judge Milton Mollen issued 
a report in 1994 documenting the “commonplace” types of procedural 
perjury routinely committed by New York police officers in their day-to-
day duties, which included lying about observing unlawful conduct or 
incriminating facts to justify a search and seizure, lying about where 
contraband was found to cover-up plainly unconstitutional conduct, and 
lying about compliance with various rules of constitutional criminal 
procedure.
195
 The commission found that perjury was a particular problem 
in drugs and weapons cases, a finding that is consistent with the pattern of 
police misconduct evident in the Rampart scandal.
196
 Indeed, all of the 
types of “testilying” identified by the Mollen Commission are on vivid 
display in the Rampart cases.  
 
 
 195. 
 For example, when officers unlawfully stop and search a vehicle because they believe it 
contains drugs or guns, officers will falsely claim in police reports and under oath that the car 
ran a red light (or committed some other traffic violation) and that they subsequently saw 
contraband in the car in plain view. To conceal an unlawful search of an individual who 
officers believe is carrying drugs or a gun, they will falsely assert that they saw a bulge in a 
person’s pocket or saw drugs and money changing hands. To justify unlawfully entering an 
apartment where officers believe narcotics or cash can be found, they pretend to have 
information from an unidentified civilian informant or claim they saw the drugs in plain view 
after responding to the premises on a radio run. To arrest people they suspect are guilty of 
dealing drugs, they falsely assert that the defendants had drugs in their possession when, in 
fact, the drugs were found elsewhere where the officers had no lawful right to be. 
See Capers, supra note 191, at 869 (quoting COMM’N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE 
CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP’T, CITY OF NEW YORK, 
COMM’N REPORT 36 (1994) (Milton Mollen, Chair)). 
 196. See Capers, supra note 191.  
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1. Lies about Consent 
One common form of procedural perjury on display in the Rampart 
cases is a false claim that a suspect “consented” to a search. Consent is 
simple to manufacture. Police need only claim that a suspect orally 
consented to a search to establish the existence of consent, although police 
in some Rampart cases went further and either forged a suspect’s signature 
on a written consent form or tricked or coerced a suspect into signing such 
a form.  
In several cases, police falsely claimed to have obtained consent to 
justify a forcible warrantless entry into a home. For example, police stated 
that they had received information from unnamed sources that a woman 
named Laura Villatora was storing cocaine and marijuana in her 
apartment. According to the arrest report, police sought and Villatora 
consented to a search of her apartment that turned up approximately seven 
pounds of marijuana.
197
 Rampart investigators later concluded, however, 
that Villatora, who was home with her daughter when the police arrived, 
did not consent to a search. When it appeared that police efforts to force 
open the door would cause serious damage to it, Villatora’s teenage 
daughter, Laura Reyes, opened the door. Officers then “grabbed Reyes by 
the hair and arm and dragged her to the living room” where they 
“demanded to know where the drugs and money were located.”198 They 
then began searching the apartment, eventually finding both drugs and 
money.
199
 One of the officers later testified to the false version of events at 
the preliminary hearing.
200
 As a result, Villatora pleaded guilty to a charge 
of unlawfully possessing marijuana with intent to sell and was sentenced 
to two years in prison.
201
 
Similarly, in several cases police falsely claimed to have obtained 
consent to search a vehicle. For example, in the course of accosting 
Villatora and her daughter, police officers also learned that Villatora’s 
marijuana supplier was a person named Porfirio Acosta. Police then 
induced Villatora to arrange for Acosta to deliver drugs to her home. 
When Acosta arrived, police detained Acosta and searched his car without 
 
 
 197. See Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 5, In re Laura Villatora, No. BA153152 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. Jan. 31, 2000). 
 198. Id. at 10. 
 199. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 13, Decl. of Michael Gannon, In re Porfirio Acosta, No. 
BA153198 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 7, 2000) (detailing interviews with Laura Villatora and her daughter, 
Laura Reyes). 
 200. In re Laura Villatora, supra note 200, Ex. B (Decl. of Brian Tyndall). 
 201. Id. 
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obtaining consent. Officers also searched his home. The officers then 
falsely stated in the arrest report that Acosta had consented to the searches. 
They even manufactured a false consent to search form.
202
 Acosta was also 
charged with possession of marijuana for purposes of sale. He pleaded 
guilty and was sentenced to three years’ probation and 120 days in county 
jail.
203
 
Another Rampart case involved Charles Harris, who was arrested after 
police allegedly recovered 203 grams of rock cocaine and a handgun in a 
supposedly consensual search of his vehicle.
204
 Investigators later 
concluded that, in fact, Harris never consented to the search.
205
 Likewise, 
police claimed to have obtained consent to search Juan Rojo’s car when, 
according to witnesses the D.A.’s office concluded to be credible, “Rojo 
was taken out of his car at gunpoint.”206 Officers testified falsely about 
these events at the preliminary hearing and suppression hearing, at which 
one officer testified that he merely “asked Rojo to step out of his vehicle 
so that he could speak with him.”207 The officers also falsely claimed that 
during this encounter Rojo consented to a search of his residence. Gricelda 
Orellana was in the residence when police turned up seeking to search it. 
According to Orellana, she “tried to lock the door” to prevent the police 
from entering.
208
 Notwithstanding those efforts, the officers entered and 
found cocaine in her bedroom. Orellana said that the cocaine belonged to 
“some guy,” but told police officers that “Rojo was innocent.”209 
Nonetheless, Orellana and Rojo both eventually pleaded guilty to one 
count of possession for sale of cocaine and each served two years in 
prison.
210
 
2. Lies about Probable Cause 
Perhaps the most common sort of lies told by the police are those used 
to establish probable cause for searches and seizures that otherwise are 
 
 
 202. In re Porfirio Acosta, supra note 202, at 6–7. It appears that the officers not only lied about 
obtaining consent from Acosta, but also either forged his signature on a consent to search form or 
coerced or tricked him into signing it. Id. 
 203. Id. at 2. 
 204. See Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 5, In re Charles Edward Harris, No. BA157278 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Mar. 6, 2000). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 6, In re Juan Cerna Rojo and Gricelda Orellana, No. 
BA156027 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 22, 2000). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. (Tyndall Decl.). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 2. 
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constitutionally unjustifiable.
211
 Numerous Rampart cases involved such 
misconduct. 
So-called “dropsy” cases are one well-known form of “testilying.”212 In 
a dropsy case, police claim that suspects in possession of drugs or guns 
“drop” the contraband before any Fourth Amendment seizure takes 
place.
213
 Since the contraband has been “abandoned” and is in “plain 
view,” the evidence is admissible. That police often resort to this type of 
perjury has been apparent for decades. Researchers observed a surge in 
dropsy cases shortly after Mapp v. Ohio was decided,
214
 in which the 
Supreme Court extended the exclusionary rule to the states.
215
 
Dropsy cases were well-represented in the Rampart scandal. In one 
case, officers discovered a bag of cocaine after they had seized two 
suspects and then conducted a warrantless forty-five minute search of an 
apartment building. The two men were arrested and charged as a result. In 
their arrest report, the officers falsely claimed to have seen one of the men 
hold and then drop the bag of cocaine.
216
 In another case, a police officer 
saw a suspect suspiciously stuffing an object under his car seat. After 
searching the vehicle, the officer discovered cocaine. He then stated in the 
arrest report, and testified at the probation revocation hearing, that he had 
observed the suspect drop the cocaine on the ground.
217
 This was later 
determined to have been false.
218
 In a third case, police had information 
that the narcotics were located in one of the rooms in a hotel.
219
 After 
entering the room without a search warrant or consent, police found 
cocaine and the two defendants inside. Instead of these facts, the arrest 
report stated that police encountered the defendants in the hallway and saw 
them drop canisters of rock cocaine to the ground.
220
 In a fourth case, 
police seized a suspect and then, apparently after searching him and 
 
 
 211. See Jennifer Hunt & Peter K. Manning, The Social Context of Police Lying, 14 SYMBOLIC 
INTERACTION 51, 56 (1991). 
 212. See Capers, supra note 191, at 868. 
 213. Id.  
 214. Id. 
 215. See, e.g., Sarah Barlow, Patterns of Arrests for Misdemeanor Narcotics Possession: 
Manhattan Police Practices 1960–62, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 549, 549–50 (1968). 
 216. See Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 10, Decl. of Olivia Rosales, In re Aristide Vanegas and 
Rodolfo Arevalo, No. BA146324 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 2000). One of the men admitted that they 
were delivering drugs to an apartment in the building at the time. Id. at 12 (Decl. of Brian Tyndall). 
 217. Resp. to Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 3, In re Oscar Lafarga, No. GA024373 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 1999). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Decl. of Natasha S. Cooper, In re Carlos Martinez Pena and 
Manuel Espinoza Ferrera, No. BA145491 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 2000).  
 220. Id. 
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finding no contraband, searched the area where the seizure occurred. The 
officers located a firearm. Instead of reporting these facts, the officers 
falsely claimed to have actually seen the suspect discarding the weapon.
221
 
The suspect, Michael Williams, was charged with possession of a firearm 
by a felon, contested the charge at trial, and was convicted. Williams was 
sentenced to serve twenty-five years to life.
222
 
Arguably more egregious than dropsy cases are cases where police 
falsely claim to have seen the suspect actually engaged in criminal 
conduct. For instance, Rampart officers detained and searched two 
individuals without probable cause.
223
 After finding cocaine, the officers 
stated in the arrest report that they had seen the suspect “engaging in the 
sale of narcotics prior to her arrest” in order “to establish the necessary 
probable cause for the detention and search.”224 Reports involving false 
claims of direct observation of criminal conduct represent a potentially 
more serious form of procedural perjury because the false statement not 
only insulates the recovery of the contraband from suppression but 
provides direct affirmative (albeit false) evidence of the suspect’s guilt, 
increasing the chances that an innocent person will be convicted. This risk 
is apparent in the case of Edward Villanueva, who was convicted of 
possession of a firearm by a felon.
225
 According to the arrest report, 
Officer Perez was manning an observation point when he personally 
observed Villanueva with the firearms. Those statements turned out to be 
false. Officer Perez later admitted that he stopped and searched Villanueva 
based only on a report from a surveillance helicopter team who claimed to 
have observed Villanueva with the guns.
226
 Officer Perez decided to report 
the facts differently out of an apparent concern that the true facts left some 
room to doubt whether probable cause existed for the search, or indeed, 
whether Villanueva ever actually possessed the guns. Some cases combine 
dropsy testimony and false claims of observed criminal activity. This 
occurred in the prosecution of Octavio Fernandez.
227
 Officers searched 
Fernandez and discovered drugs. To justify the search, police falsely 
 
 
 221. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Ex. A, Decl. of Richard A. Rosenthal, In re Michael 
Williams, No. BA128788 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000). 
 222. Id. at 2. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Ex. A at 1–2, Decl. of Richard A. Rosenthal, In re Sonia 
Castro, No. BA128771 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000). 
 225. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2, In re Edward Yumol Villanueva, No. BA135887 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 2000).  
 226. Id. Decl. of Natasha S. Cooper at 8. 
 227. Pet. for Writ of Habea[s] Corpus at 5, In re Octavio Fernandez, No. BA136807 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. Apr. 10, 2000). 
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claimed both that they witnessed Fernandez selling drugs and that he 
dropped them prior to being seized.
228
 
Another common type of procedural perjury involves misstatements 
regarding the location in which contraband was found. In one case, 
officers searched a suspect’s car and found a pouch of heroin-filled 
balloons above the car’s rearview mirror.229 Worried that they lacked 
probable cause for the automobile search, the officers falsely reported that 
the balloons had been found in one of the suspect’s socks.230 In another 
case, officers discovered marijuana during a search of a suspect’s 
residence and reported instead that it was found either on his person or in 
his car.
231
 In a third case, officers falsely stated they recovered a gun near 
the front door of the defendant’s apartment and ammunition in his pocket. 
These facts formed the basis for charging the defendant as a felon in 
possession of a gun, for which he served four years in state prison. 
Credible evidence later revealed that police had found the gun inside the 
defendant’s apartment, under a bed, in a search of doubtful constitutional 
validity. The gun, moreover, likely belonged to someone else.
232
 
3. Lies about Miranda Compliance 
While police engage in procedural perjury most frequently to avoid 
Fourth Amendment suppression concerns, police also commit perjury to 
evade other constitutional rules. This is especially true with respect to 
compliance with the Miranda rules. Again, the willingness of police to lie 
about their compliance with Miranda in order to ensure that incriminating 
admissions or confessions made by suspects under interrogation are 
admissible has been noted by other scholars. While conducting 
observational studies of police interrogations, Professor Richard Uviller 
 
 
 228. Id. 
 229. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 4, In re Blanca Sahagun and Carlos Carranza, No. 
BA147177 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 24, 2000).  
 230. Id. at Ex. A, Decl. of Laura Laesecke. One or both suspects may have been innocent. 
Carranza’s account of the incident confirmed what Perez testified to, which is that Carranza never 
possessed heroin. However, Carranza admitted that “he helped Sahagun arrange the sale of heroin on 
the day of the incident,” which would seem to make him an accomplice. Sahagun, however, denied the 
charges, alleging that “the entire arrest report was fabricated because she refused to be an informant 
for Perez.” Sahagun claimed “that an officer at Rampart station displayed a clear baggie containing 
brightly colored objects and told Carranza in her presence that he would ‘put this in [Carranza’s] 
shoes.’” Id. at Ex. B (Decl. of Brian Tyndall (alterations in original)). 
 231. See Answer to Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Decl. of Vesna Maras, In re Gene Serrano, 
No. BA150628 (Cal. Super. Ct., June 9, 2000). 
 232. See Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Decl. of Natasha S. Cooper, In re Salvador Luis Arias, 
No. BA090914 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 12, 2000). 
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noticed that officers often “advance slightly the moment at which the 
Miranda warnings were recited to satisfy the courts’ insistence that they 
precede the very first question in a course of interrogation.”233 This type of 
shading of the truth occurred while police were under the known 
observation of an outsider. When police have no reason to believe they are 
being observed, even more egregious deceptions are sometimes attempted. 
For instance, many of the Rampart cases included false statements by 
police that they had complied with Miranda. In the Charles Harris case 
mentioned above, not only did police falsely claim that Harris consented 
to a car search, they also falsely claimed to have advised him of his 
Miranda rights.
234
 These false claims of Miranda compliance are often 
only the necessary precedents to further false claims about incriminating 
statements falsely attributed to the suspect. This too was true in the Harris 
case, where not only did police lie about Mirandizing Harris, they also 
attributed incriminating admissions to Harris that he never made,
235
 
casting his actual guilt into doubt. The same pattern appears in the arrest 
and prosecution of Carlos Romero. In that case, police conducted a 
warrantless and nonconsensual search of a residence. During the search, 
police threatened to arrest Romero’s sister, who in response “identified her 
brother as a narcotics dealer and directed them to a stash of cocaine.”236 
The officers then arrested Romero. They sanitized the search and seizure 
by falsely claiming to have been directed to the stash of drugs by Romero 
himself after they had advised him of his Miranda rights.
237
 
C. The Blurred Line Between Procedural and Substantive Perjury, and 
Other Forms Of Police Corruption 
In some cases, it is impossible to determine whether perjury was 
committed merely to secure a shortcut to conviction of a guilty suspect or 
instead to convict an innocent man. Such was the case with Julian Lopez 
Hernandez. According to the arrest report, Hernandez was arrested after 
police found eleven balloons of heroin during a consensual search of his 
 
 
 233. H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL: A COLUMBIA LAW PROFESSOR’S YEAR ON THE 
STREETS WITH THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE 116 (Contemporary Books 1988) (cited and discussed in 
Slobogin, supra note 192, at 1043 (speculating that “lying about events in the interrogation room may 
be routine”)). 
 234. See In re Charles Edward Harris, supra note 205, Decl. of Laura Laesecke at 1. 
 235. See id. 
 236. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Ex. A at 1–2, Decl. of Richard A. Rosenthal, In re Carlos 
Romero, No. BA154270 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 10, 1999).  
 237. Id. 
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apartment. After his arrest, police claimed that they Mirandized 
Hernandez, questioned him, and obtained incriminating statements. 
Hernandez pleaded guilty and was permitted to take advantage of 
diversion.
238
 During the subsequent Rampart investigation, Officer Perez 
admitted under oath that Hernandez did not consent to the search and that 
the officers never read Hernandez his Miranda rights prior to questioning 
him.
239
 Perez thus admitted to serious procedural flaws in the search and 
arrest of Hernandez, but appears to have maintained a belief in 
Hernandez’s substantive guilt. Hernandez, however, asserted an entirely 
different story. “[H]e claimed that the officers escorted him to an 
unfamiliar apartment building and used a set of keys owned by a man 
known as ‘Gerardo’ to open the apartment door. Inside, they found 
numerous colored balloons on a windowsill in the living room.” 
Hernandez “denied living at the location or knowing anything about the 
narcotics,” but stated that he “pled guilty to avoid going to prison.”240 
Either way, Hernandez was wrongfully convicted, but whether he was 
actually innocent is impossible to determine on the scant available record.  
Procedural perjury also goes hand-in-glove with other forms of police 
corruption. William Zepeda and Argelia Diaz were convicted of 
possession of cocaine for purposes of sale.
241
 Both served two year 
sentences after agreeing to plea bargains.
242
 In making the arrest, the 
officers lied about seeing Zepeda and Diaz selling drugs, and falsely 
claimed to have obtained consent to search their apartment. While there, 
the officers “stole a large sum of money from their apartment.”243 They 
included these false facts in the arrest report, and then repeated the lies at 
the preliminary hearing. All of the misconduct occurring in the 
prosecution of Charles Harris was accompanied, similarly, by the 
unreported appropriation of $6,000 from Harris’s residence and the theft 
of at least $500 by the officers.
244
 In the Romero case, Officer Durden 
 
 
 238. See Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2, In re Julian Lopez Hernandez, No. BA160279 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000). 
 239. Id., Decl. of Laura Laesecke.  
 240. Id., Decl. of Brian Tyndall. 
 241. Pet. For Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2, In re William Zepeda and Argelia Diaz, No. BA156980 
(Cal. Super. Ct., Mar. 17, 2000).  
 242. Id.  
 243. Id., Decl. of Olivia Rosales. 
 244. In re Charles Harris, supra note 193, at Decl. of Laura Laesecke. According to Rafael Perez, 
the $6000 along with three guns seized from Harris’s house were given to Harris’s sister in exchange 
for information about drug dealers. Id. 
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reportedly stole several pieces of jewelry from a suspect’s residence, as 
well as $1,500 in cash.
245
  
All of the false convictions in the Tulia cases, similarly, may have been 
a collateral consequence of the efforts of a corrupt undercover officer to 
steal drug “buy” money from the Drug Task Force.246 At least some people 
believe that Officer Coleman pocketed the buy money, lied about buying 
powder cocaine from the Tulia defendants, and then evidenced his 
purported buys by turning in small amounts of white powder that he mixed 
himself, each containing only enough cocaine to trigger a positive reading 
on a lab test.
247
 In these cases, police lies about compliance with 
constitutional rules were concomitant with, or in service to, other acts of 
corruption.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
Police misconduct, when it occurs, is a major source of wrongful 
convictions. The profile of those most at risk of such wrongful convictions 
likely differs in some respects from that of other wrongfully convicted 
persons. The offenses are generally less serious, and the sentences less 
severe, than those involved in the DNA exoneration cases. These cases 
involve drugs and guns, assaults on police officers, charges of disturbing 
the peace, resisting arrest, or other allegedly violent or aggressive conduct 
directed at the police. Hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of people 
have been convicted of such crimes. There is simply no way to know how 
many persons convicted of such offenses were actually innocent, but both 
Rampart and Tulia provide stark evidence that police misconduct can, and 
does, result in wrongful convictions. 
Comparison of the mass exoneration data with prior exoneration 
studies suggests that two important adjustments to the empirical picture of 
wrongful convictions may be in order. Although earlier studies of 
wrongful convictions found only a small number of cases involving guilty 
pleas, in the mass exoneration cases, guilty pleas provided the main 
procedural vehicle to criminal conviction. In more than 80% of the 
combined Rampart and Tulia cases, innocent defendants pleaded guilty. 
While innocence did seem to provide a marginal incentive to some 
defendants to reject guilty pleas, actually innocent Rampart exonerees held 
 
 
 245. See Romero Pet., supra note 236, Ex. A at 2 (Decl. of Richard A. Rosenthal). 
 246. See BLAKESLEE, supra note 30, at 88. 
 247. Id. at 88–89. 
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out for trials only slightly more frequently than their guilty counterparts.
248
 
The Rampart and Tulia exoneration data thus provides strong reason to 
suspect that guilty pleas are not insulated from the risk of wrongful 
convictions. 
Consideration of this data should also raise the profile of perjury 
among the causes of wrongful conviction. Although eyewitness 
misidentification has received a substantial amount of attention as one of 
the main identified contributing factors in wrongful convictions, the mass 
exoneration cases make clear that the “causes” of wrongful convictions 
vary significantly by crime. These exonerations show that police 
misconduct is a potentially significant cause of wrongful convictions in its 
own right. Procedural reforms that reduce the incidence of police 
misconduct, therefore, should be high on the list of priorities among those 
working to reduce wrongful convictions. 
 
 
 248. See infra Part V.D.  
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APPENDIX 
“Actually Innocent” Rampart Exonerees 
1. Alfaro, George Kenneth 
2. Bailey, Samuel Joseph 
3. Barrios, Diego 
4. Booker, Esaw 
5. Candido, Roberto 
6. Carrillo, Delbert 
7. Chavez, Emmanuel 
8. Davalos, Octavio Gonzalez 
9. Escobar, Edgar 
10. Estrada, Leonel Ramos (aka Gregorio Ramos Lopez) 
11. Flores, Luis Manuel 
12. Gomez, Alfredo 
13. Guardado, Manuel 
14. Guevara, Carlos 
15. Harris, Clinton 
16. Hernandez, Miguel 
17. Lara, Jose Armando 
18. Lobos, Allan Manrique 
19. Madrid, Jose Hugo 
20. Matlong, Rene Barela (aka Rene Mationg) 
21. Montes, Roy 
22. Munoz, Raul Alfredo 
23. Natividad, Cesar aka Danny Banuelos 
24. Newman, Russell 
25. Oliver, Ivan 
26. Ordonez, Felipe Enriquez 
27. Ovando, Javier Francisco 
28. Perez, Jose  
29. Peters, Gerald 
30. Rivas, Walter 
31. Rodriguez, Raul 
32. Rojas, Ruben 
33. Tapia, Daniel 
34. Thomas, James 
35. Torrecillas, Juan 
36. Umana, Alex 
37. Wesley, Mohammed Wayman 
38. Zambrano, Rafael 
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Tulia Exonerees 
1. Allen, Dennis Mitchell 
2. Barrow, James Ray 
3. Barrow, Landis 
4. Barrow, Leroy  
5. Barrow, Mandis Charles 
6. Benard, Troy 
7. Brookins, Freddie Wesley 
8. Cooper, Marlyn Joyce 
9. Ervin, Aremnu Jerrod 
10. Fowler, Michael 
11. Fry, Jason Paul 
12. Fry, Vickie 
13. Hall, Willie B. 
14. Henderson, Cleveland Joe 
15. Henry. Mandrell L. 
16. Jackson, Christopher Eugene 
17. Kelly, Denise 
18. Kelly Sr., Eliga 
19. Klein, Calvin Kent 
20. Love, William Cash 
21. Marshall, Joseph Corey 
22. Mata, Laura Ann 
23. McCray, Vincent Dwight 
24. Moore, Joe Welton 
25. Olivarez, Daniel G. 
26. Powell, Kenneth Ray 
27. Robinson, Benny Lee 
28. Shelton, Finaye 
29. Smith, Donald Wayne 
30. Smith, Yolanda Yvonne 
31. Strickland, Romona Lynn 
32. Towery, Timothy Wayne 
33. White, Kareem Abdul Jabbar 
34. White, Kizzie Rashawn 
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35. Williams, Alberta Stell 
36. Williams, Jason Jerome 
37. Williams, Michelle 
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